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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the implication of China’s near completion of a viable 
nuclear triad. The objective is to determine first, how this submarine will fit into China’s 
no-first-use policy with regards to their nuclear weapons.  And second, determine how 
advanced this weapon platform will be. With the introduction of multiple Type 094 “Jin” 
class ballistic missile submarines, has Beijing set the stage for a possible return to Cold 
War level anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations by the United States? 
The Type 094 has been discussed at length in open source publications.  This 
thesis advances those discussions by examining them in detail.  Expected noise level, 
target sets, and class size are dissected and compared to historical data to verify the 
likelihood of mission tactics.   This technical data, combined with a summary of the 
challenges faced in terms of submarine communications and control, will highlight 
Beijing’s decision to deploy this new technology conservatively or more … to maximize 
the intended target set.  Washington must view the Type 094 as a vast improvement over 
their single Type 092 “Xia” class ballistic missile submarine.  Atrophied United States 
ASW assets must be upgraded to meet this new challenge. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.   PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
China’s successful sea trials of the Type 094 ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) 
have become an issue of concern for regional and global planners.  A large body of 
writing has been published on the capabilities and prospective deployments of this new 
submarine.  However, what has been overlooked is how deploying a ballistic missile 
submarine changes the makeup of China’s nuclear deterrent force.  Thus, this thesis will 
address the question: What benefits does a ballistic missile submarine offer a country that 
has adopted a strict no-first-use policy—and at what cost to China?  
The deployment of reliable sea-based ballistic missiles has long been the goal of 
Chinese military planners.  The Type 092 Xia-class SSBN, commissioned in 1981, was 
unreliable and predominately pier-bound, and China was never able to successfully 
deploy the Xia on a deterrent patrol.  In addition, the Xia-class SSBN carried the JL-1 
ballistic missile, with very limited range and capabilities.  These circumstances changed 
when a new class of Chinese submarines, the Type 094 Jin, emerged as follow-on to the 
Xia-class.  Currently, two to three “Jin” class ballistic missile submarines have been 
photographed in various military ports along the Chinese coast.  By all accounts the Jin is 
a drastic improvement over the Xia, increasing the likelihood that China will be able to 
deploy a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent patrol in the near future.   
Why is China aggressively acquiring sea-based missile technology?  At first 
glance it seems redundant, given their robust and modernizing arsenal of land-based 
nuclear weapons.  In recent years, China has shifted away from its reliance on liquid-
fueled, land-based nuclear weapons.  Liquid-fueled weapons are vulnerable to first strike 
capability because of their slow fueling times and the permanent and easily identifiable 
nature of their launch sites.  Now, Beijing has begun to focus more on the use of mobile 
land-based nuclear weapons.  Mobile, solid-fueled, land-based missiles offer significant 
advantages over liquid-fueled missiles deployed in either above ground launch platforms 
or traditional hardened silos because of their rapid deployment time and their mobility, 
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which makes them harder to detect and destroy.  While there some problems associated 
with these weapon systems, including a vulnerable communications network that is 
susceptible to an initial nuclear attack, they do provide the communist leadership 
command and control options they could not possibly have with ballistic missile 
submarines.1 
Even with the recent advantages gained with mobile, solid-fueled, land-based 
missiles, China is developing a sea-based alternative as another “tier” in its pursuit of a 
survivable nuclear deterrent.  Nuclear powers, including the United States, France, 
Russia, and Great Britain, have all pursued submarine-launched ballistic missiles because 
of their robust survivability.  That is, if a ballistic missile submarine is at sea in an 
unknown (to the enemy) location, it can offer the assured deployment of a second strike.  
In order to be successful in this effort, China must be able to build and deploy 
multiple capable ballistic missile submarines.  The single Type 092 is the only sub of its 
type, and it is antiquated and acoustically disadvantaged by today’s standards.2  It has 
limited communications, missile, and fire control systems that minimize its lethal range 
and effectiveness.  In retrospect, the Type 092 is more of a “test-bed” for technology then 
actual implemented nuclear deterrent.  However, the new Chinese Type 094 submarine 
likely employs proven Type 093 based quieting systems that approach modern American, 
Russian, and German-built submarines.  These systems give the Type 094 the technology 
to remain hidden from modern antisubmarine forces.   Even with advanced U.S. anti-
submarine warfare tactics, a modern ballistic missile submarine like the Type 094 can be 
extremely difficult to find.  If China is able to construct and regularly deploy a fleet of 
Jin-class submarines—with the JL-2 long-range ballistic missile - the United States will 
have to plan for, and take into account when dealing with Beijing, a survivable Chinese 
nuclear deterrent.3   
                                                 
1 Communications with submarines require a great deal of support and equipment.  Even with the best 
systems, submarines will go hours at a time completely out of communications reach.  These issues will be 
discussed further in subsequent chapters. 
2 There are conflicting reports that argue a second Type 092 was either lost in a fire during 
construction or lost at sea. 
3 The US will have to deal with a survivable Chinese nuclear deterrent in any case with the DF-31A. 
Bonnie Glaser, e-mail message to author, 7 April 2009. 
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B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis will therefore address two questions. First, what benefits does China 
expect to gain from a robust, sea-based deterrent?  There are numerous recognized 
advantages to ballistic missile submarines—so much so that Great Britain relies solely on 
them for strategic deterrence.4  Possible reasons range from the more tangible (real) 
aspects of stealth, reliability, survivability, and streamlined command structure to more 
ideational issues such as political prestige, international influence, and entry into a truly 
prestigious group (United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France).  However, each of 
these should be evaluated separately, as they are potential alternatives and they tell us 
much about Chinese thinking regarding nuclear warfare.  Therefore, part of my thesis 
problem is to assess why China has chosen to procure a sea-based deterrent system at this 
time. 
Second, should the United States, China’s chief security competitor, adjust its 
current defense of Taiwan tactics because of a credible Chinese second-strike ability? 
The United States has three options – increase the scope of the current missile defense 
systems, use additional resources (nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN)s and various 
anti-submarine tactics) to vigorously hunt and track Chinese ballistic missile submarines, 
or to acknowledge Chinese survivable second-strike capability and adjust policy.  
Washington is already doing the first, and finding room in the budget for new ASW—
while preparing to acknowledge and adjust policy.  As a result, U.S. actions in response 
to conflict over Taiwan must be adjusted to account for the possibility of grave 
consequences.  The possibility of losing one West Coast city, as a result of an American 
interference over another Taiwan Strait crisis, becomes much more likely. Exploring 
Washington’s response options to a new strategic threat is necessary.  Therefore, part of 
this thesis will be directed toward exploring possible avenues to consider when facing a 
hostile country with a survivable nuclear deterrent. 
 
                                                 
4 Great Britain also has a “reliance on NATO response.” Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy 
(Retired), conversation, 30 December 2008. 
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The preliminary questions assessed in this thesis research are: 
• Why is China pursuing a significant viable SSBN force?  How does this 
compare to other countries, including the United States, which have relied 
on sea-based nuclear deterrents during the cold war?  Are projects such as 
the missile defense systems being employed by the United States and 
Japan, driving this decision? 
• How will China employ its nuclear ballistic missile submarines? Different 
scenarios are possible depending on the size of the force.  According to 
reports, two “Jin” class submarines have been imaged.  How could China 
employ these two submarines?  What if they increase that number to five 
or more?  Where sorts of considerations will drive basing decisions?    
• Beijing has always controlled nuclear weapons at the highest level.  Great 
care, including storing warheads and missiles in different locations, 
ensures that inadvertent launch is nearly impossible.  Trusting low-level 
commanders, operating independently at sea, is a big step for Chinese 
leaders.  How can this task be accomplished in China today?  
• How will China react to a ballistic missile submarine casualty?  Will 
Beijing immediately assume an attack has occurred against their deterrent 
force – and launch their remaining weapons as a response?  How much 
more realistic are NFU and the policy of minimal deterrence with SSBNs? 
• Finally, consider this development in terms of current U.S. policy.  How 
can this policy, and associated acquisitions, be adjusted to account for the 
current shortcomings in ASW capabilities?   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a large literature on issues related to this thesis.  Many questions have 
been addressed, and this section surveys the answers provided in the existing literature. 
What are the benefits of ballistic missile submarines? Why does Great Britain gain by 
relying solely on this type of deterrent?  Does nuclear war-gaming from the Cold War 
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period offer any insight into the possible scenarios involving ballistic missile 
submarines?  How do the academic, military, and press communities foresee the 
employment of the Jin-class submarine? How many do they propose will be launched? 
How will these submarines be controlled?  How do the United States and Japan feel 
about the Jin-class?  With the new SSBNs, is there any indication that China will depart 
from its no nuclear first use policy of nuclear weapons5 
There certainly must be tangible benefits to SSBNs development and deployment.  
The five most powerful nuclear countries have all pursued ballistic missile submarines.  
In looking at why a country would chose ballistic missile submarines over, or in addition 
to, other nuclear weapons, Great Britain’s nuclear deterrence efforts offer a useful case 
study.  Great Britain relies solely on four Vanguard-class submarines to provide its 
nuclear deterrent.  In its Select Committee on Defense Report (published in 2007 by the 
House of Commons) it provides a comparison of nuclear weapons.  Table 1 shows 
portions of this data that are applicable to Chinese decision makers. 
                                                 
5 China may be deriving benefits of NFU policy, added deterrent effect from doubts about credibility 
of the NFU commitment, and from the ability in practice to abandon NFU policy mid-step.  Admiral Eric 
A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired), conversation, 30 December 2008.  This question suggests that 
technology might drive China to reconsider its NFU policy (this assertion will be covered in detail in 
chapter IV).  While this may be the case in the future, in recent years there are other reasons that the 
Chinese have questioned the NFU policy.  Bonnie Glaser, a Senior Associate, Freeman Chair in China 
Studies for the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) argues that China’s deterrent has been 
weakened by the U.S. development of long-range conventional strike weapons.  Modifying the NFU 
position, essentially making it conditional, would bolster China’s deterrence.  Politically, however, that 
option is not available.  Bonnie Glaser, e-mail message to author, 7 April 2009. 
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Table 1.   Assessment of Deterrent Options6 
Option Assessment 
Air-based system equipped with cruise missiles Vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks 
 Increasing readiness would be visible and 
potentially escalatory in times of crisis 
 High rate/cost of aircraft upkeep and maintenance 
 Very Costly 
Land (silo)-based systems Vulnerable to pre-emptive attack; immobile and 
impossible to conceal 
 Expensive/Expansive command and control system 
 Cost 2 – 3 times as much as submarines 
Land (mobile)-based systems Vulnerable to pre-emptive attack 
 Expensive/Expansive command and control system 
Ship-based system  (ballistic missile surface ship) Vulnerable to pre-emptive attack; easier to detect 
and tract than a submarine 
 Less expensive but also less capable than a 
submarine-based option 
Submarine-based system (ballistic missile 
submarine) 
SSBN are undetectable7 
 Worldwide deterrent effect 
 
In this preliminary look, it is clear that the decision to pursue submarines has 
many advantages for Beijing, over other nuclear options. Given the lessons learned from 
the advancement of precision weapon technology against moveable targets, putting 
mobile launchers at risk, survivability is likely a main goal for selecting to build SSBNs.8 
                                                 
6 Derived from Table 7: The Government’s assessment of deterrent options found in Defence 
Committee, Parliament, House of Commons, Great Britain, The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent: the White Paper, Ninth Report of Session 2006-07 (London: House of Commons, The Stationary 
Office 2007), 46. 
7 For the purpose of their deterrence strategy, Great Britain considers their SSBN’s to be undetectable.  
In reality, submarines can be tracked by a number of sources.  Captain Bernard D. Cole, U.S. Navy retired, 
conversation, 24 December 2008.  
8 The ability of the United States precision missiles in Gulf Wars 1 & 2 has played a significant role in 
Beijing decision-making.  The question of survivability, even of their mobile nuclear forces, becomes a 
major factor in the Chinese push for another nuclear choice.  Chinese military experts have said privately 
that they fear that rapid development in US ISR capabilities will in the future render their mobile land-
based systems vulnerable.  They “don’t want to put all their eggs in one basket.”  Bonnie Glaser, e-mail 
message to author, 7 April 2009. 
 7
But, as noted above, there are costs associated with relying on SSBNs.  This thesis will 
further examine the way that China views these relative costs and benefits. 
SSBN deployment is generally recognized to require three things: decentralized 
command of nuclear weapons, including storing the missile and warhead together; 
preprogrammed targets; and a plan of action for an SSBN casualty.9   All three of these 
are drastic changes to Chinese doctrine.  First, there is a good possibility that China has 
never stored its missiles in the same location as warheads—this cannot be the case on 
submarines once deployed at sea.10  Second, “In May 2000, China, together with the 
other four nuclear-weapon states, issued a joint statement declaring that their nuclear 
weapons are not targeted at any country.”11  Ballistic missile submarines may not be 
“pointed” at any country, however targeting data will likely be stored onboard and 
downloaded to the weapons when launch codes are received.  Finally, China has always 
upheld that the “development of nuclear weapons has always been for the purpose of self-
defense …the Chinese government has solemnly declared that it would not be the first to 
use such weapons at any time and in any circumstance.”12 However, the question of 
response after a suspected attack in a time of crisis over the loss of an SSBN must be 
raised. 
The significance of the construction of the Type 094 has caused alarm in recent 
years.  While many countries, including the United States, are drawing down their 
submarine forces, China continues to build submarines at a significant rate.13  This raises 
                                                 
9 It is very difficult for any country to determine why a submarine is lost.  During the Cold War, the 
United States and Russia suffered submarine losses that are still shrouded in controversy.  Regardless, in a 
crisis situation it is unlikely that China would consider the loss of an SSBN as an accident.  
10 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, Matthew G. Mcinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. 
Nuclear War Planning, The Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council. 
(November 2006), http://www.nukestrat.com/china/chinareport.htm (accessed 27 November 2008), 82. 
11 This is the one item that is likely the easiest to overcome.  It is likely that in peacetime, the weapons 
themselves have no targeting data.  However, that data must be on board the submarine.  White Paper: 
China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. (People’s Republic of China, 
Information Office of the State Council, 2005), 6. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Chinese officials still argue that their nuclear stockpiles are still much, much lower than the United 
States and Russia.  “China’s New Sub Base to Make Waves,” editorial, Jane’s Naval Forces News, 2 
March 2006, www.janes.com (accessed 3 March 2008). 
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the question of how China plans to use its submarines.  Numerous researchers address 
this issue who might be usefully grouped into three distinct classifications of Chinese 
SSBN writers.  The first group, and most obvious, is the military.  Military professors 
(Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, etc.) are combined with actual military 
personnel—both retired and active duty-- to complete this group.  The second group is 
the press—including the foreign press, which provides a basic summary of what the 
general public believes.  The last group is made up of the analytic professionals, which 
includes public intellectuals and “think tanks.”  The professionals are the non-military 
strategists who often have a large impact on policy-makers.   
There is one overall consensus among the three groups findings concerning the 
Type 094 submarine.  Everyone believes that the Type 094 is as acoustically advanced as 
the Victor III Russian submarine, with a sound signature is considered to be equal to that 
of the U.S. Los Angeles class submarine, the assumed “opponent” of the Type 094.14  The 
basis for this claim is due to the fact that the Type 094 is built on Type 093 technologies; 
so most assume that the Type 094 will be equally as quiet as the Type 093.15  One PRC-
affiliated press source asserted that the Type 094 would be as ultra-quiet as the U.S. Ohio 
class SSBN.16 Even without Ohio-class quieting, an acoustic advantage equal to a Victor 
III would give China the ability to deploy the 094 outside of local waters undetected.   
Although most researchers agree that the Type 094 will be very quiet, distinct 
disagreements arise over how the Type 094 will be deployed.  The first question of 
deployment is: what ports will China use to deploy the Type 094?  China’s recent 
completion of the Yalong Bay submarine base on the island of Hainan gives China the 
                                                 
14 James C. Bussert, “Chinese Submarines Pose a Double-Edged Challenge,” SIGNAL Magazine, 
December 2003, http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=93&print=yes (accessed 3 March 
2008), 4; Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force: Insights 
from Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), 67; Richard D. Fisher, Jr, 
“The Impact of Foreign Technology on China’s Submarine Force and Operations,” in Andrew S. Erickson, 
Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson (eds.), China’s Future Nuclear Submarine 
Force, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 149;  Christopher McConnaughy, “China’s Undersea 
Nuclear Deterrent: Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?” in Ibid., 92. 
15 The Type 093 Shang-class submarine incorporates cutting edge technology considered equal to the 
U.S. Los Angeles- class submarine.  
16 “Chinese Navy Completes Construction of “094” Nuclear Submarine,” trans. of Ming Pao Online, 
Hong Kong, (25 July 2007), BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 26 July 2007.  
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ability to deploy the Type 094 closer to deep water.  While every group feels that China 
will use Yalong Bay as a home base for the Type 094,17 they are split on whether using 
this base is advantageous.18  If the United States mainland is China’s primary target then 
Yalong Bay, which opens to the South China Sea, is too far from the United States.  The 
JL-2’s assumed range is 6000-8000km and if the Type 094 deploys to the South China 
Sea then they cannot effectively attack the United States mainland.  Toshi Yoshihara, a 
professor at the Naval War College, states the problem best by bringing up the question: 
“Why would China want to operate further from the United States?”19 
Setting aside the issue of Yalong Bay, there is no question that China will operate 
the Type 094 in the Yellow Sea.  This is where the consensus ends.  The professionals 
and the press believe that China will deploy their submarines into the open ocean.20  The 
likelihood of U.S. submarine superiority in the Yellow Sea is the reason the analysts and 
the press think that China will deploy to the Pacific.  If they are deployed to the Pacific, 
their “time on target” is decreased, giving the United States less time to respond to a 
ballistic missile attack.  On the other hand, the military writers believe that China will 
employ a “bastion” strategy, keeping their subs under close air and surface cover similar 
                                                 
17 “China’s New Sub Base to Make Waves,” 1-2.  Jing-dong Yuan, “Do China’s New Submarines 
Signal a New Strategy?” WMD Insights, July/Aug 2007, 
http://www.wmdinsights.com/I17/I17_EA1_ChinasNewSubmarines.htm (accessed 26 February 2008), 1-3; 
Mure Dickie and Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Concerns as China Builds Nuclear Subs,” Financial Times 
(London, England) 25 May 2007, 7;  Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Emerging Military Doctrine: A Role For 
Nuclear Submarines?,” in Erickson, Goldstein, Murray, and Wilson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2007), 52;  Toshi Yoshihara, “U.S. Ballistic-Missile Defense and China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: A 
Preliminary Assessment,” in Ibid., 342;  Fisher, 138.  James Patton, “Cold War SSN Operations: Lessons 
for Understanding Chinese Naval Development,” in Erickson, Goldstein, Murray, and Wilson, 278. 
18 “China’s New Sub Base to Make Waves,” 1-2.  Yoshihara, 342. Fisher,138. 
19 “China’s New Sub Base to Make Waves,” 1-2.  Yoshihara, 342. Fisher,138. 
20 Jing-dong Yuan, WMD Insights, 1-2.  “Rising China Threat Unmet If U.S. Navy Doesn’t Seek 
Funds To Counter It, Analysts Say,” editorial, Defense Daily International 18 January 2008, 
http://www.defensedaily.com/VIP/common/pub/ddi/ddi01180801.html (accessed 9 February 2008); Bill 
Gertz, “China Sub Secretly Stalked U.S. Fleet; Surfaced Within Torpedo Range of Aircraft Carrier Battle 
Group,” The Washington Times (13 November 2006), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20061113-121539-3317r.htm (accessed 9 February 2008);  Paul 
J. Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1999), 27;  Fisher,138.  Peter Howarth, China’s Rising Sea Power: The PLA 
Navy’s Submarine Challenge (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 36. 
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to the Soviet Union, keeping the Type 094 protected in the Yellow Sea.21  The reason 
that military writers are in consensus on this is because the Yellow Sea offers distinct 
advantages for China as it makes the risk of open ocean operations unnecessary.22 
While the military writers give sound reasoning for the Chinese keeping the Type 
094 in local waters, their point of view only accounts for a one-to-one submarine ratio 
between attack and missile boats.  China will likely deploy their SSNs as SSBN escorts, 
with specific orders to protect the SSBNs at any cost.23  Since China already outnumbers 
U.S. submarines four-to-one (with the ratio increasing every year) the United States may 
not have the necessary numbers to effectively keep the Chinese out of the Pacific.24   
On the subject of numbers, there is disagreement over the number of Type 094 
submarines likely to be constructed.  If China follows Great Britain’s model that is based 
on the idea that in “keeping one submarine on patrol at all times, the UK avoids the risk 
of sending incorrect or misleading signals to a potential adversary at times of heightened 
alert,”25 it is likely that China will develop four to six missile submarines. 
While a great amount of research and speculation has been dedicated to figuring 
out the situations surrounding the development of the Type 094, there has been little 
research dedicated to understanding the options available to the United States.  Given a 
robust second-strike capability, China will have a much greater bargaining chip in East 
Asia regional affairs.  The final goal of this thesis will be to outline which bargaining 
options are affected by this Chinese development. 
                                                 
21 Robert G. Loewenthal, “Cold War Insights Into China’s New Ballistic-Missile Submarine Fleet,” in 
Erickson, Goldstein, Murray, and Wilson, 300;  Christopher McConnaughy, in Ibid., 97;  Michael 
McDevitt, “Sea Denial With Chinese Characteristics,” in Ibid., 369;  Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Maturing 
Navy,” in Ibid., 10; James Patton, in Ibid., 278;   Godwin, 52; William S. Murrary, “An Overview of the 
PLAN Submarine Force,” in Erickson, Goldstein, Murray, Wilson, 68;  Yoshihara, 343; 
22 Ibid.;  McConnaughy, 96;  McVadon, 10;  Patton, 278. 
23 This was common for Russian nuclear forces when they deployed their SSBNs to bastions. 
24 There are other assets available for submarine detections and tracking (Aerial, Space, and Surface), 
and these would affect this balance.  However, a competent SSBN crew traveling at patrol speeds easily 
overcomes these overt tracking methods. 
25 Defence Committee, Parliament, House of Commons, 8. 
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D. METHODOLOGY AND ROADMAP 
This thesis puts the deployment of new Chinese ballistic missile into broader 
political and strategic context by examining it through technical, historical, and strategic 
theory lenses.  Each sheds light on the program and what it implies for the future of Asia 
pacific security situation.  By researching this situation using a combination of technical 
assessment, SSBN normalcy, and local restraints, Chinese deployment options will be 
highlighted that may have otherwise gone unnoticed. Using these options can be 
implemented in a hypothetical Taiwan straights crisis—which results in a nuclear 
escalation—this will be a guide for U.S. response.  After successful implementation 
policy recommendations can be made regarding the adjustment of U.S. strategy.  
This starts with a review of the benefits of ballistic missile submarines.  Primarily 
using the British deterrent model (in addition to French, U.S. and Russian), this course of 
research will illuminate the expected payoff for Chinese planners. This stage of research 
will also illustrate problems associated with SSBN deterrence patrols.  Primary evidence 
for this portion will be from a mixture of U.S. and Chinese nuclear experts (academics 
and think tanks).    
In addition, closely examining how Beijing intends to control, employ, and 
develop the Type 094 will yield unique benefits.  Unlike other weapon systems, the Type 
094 must be analyzed in broad terms, including communications structure, numbers, and 
external features.26  Without an intimate knowledge of the Type 094 and accurate 
estimations of its survivability it will be difficult to estimate how the Chinese will employ 
this weapon system.  A 4-5 SSBN fleet is expected;1-2 boats built for “crisis response” is 
less likely, although this would be more in line with Chinese no-first-use policy.  
Current Chinese and United States published state doctrines (White Papers and all 
levels of published U.S. strategy) are used for overall themes these countries wish to 
display.  Both countries’ words will be analyzed closely to accurately assess the expected 
SSBN actions in times of crisis.  Since the Type 094 is relatively new, open source 
                                                 
26 Deterrence by acquisition, rather than demonstrated capability, may apply to systems unlikely to be 
used in reality. Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Conversation, 30 December 2008. 
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(newspapers, etc.) will also be employed to find the most recent data.  In addition, a 
massive amount of Chinese language materials, recently utilized by Goldstein and 
Murray, will provide additional primary evidence in order to bolster the conclusion. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND BENEFITS OF THE TYPE 094 
China has been pursuing a ballistic missile submarine technology since the middle 
of the last century.  Their first “try,” the Type 092 class, never reached the level of a 
successful deterrent.  Following the Cold War, the world powers have rapidly decreased 
their level of operating nuclear stockpiles.  China, on the other hand, has continued to 
pursue new nuclear weapons and better delivery systems as part of their military 
modernization.  The Type 094’s introduction not only signals a great leap in 
modernization, but also the potential introduction of another nuclear “leg,” completing 
their triad.  
This chapter will explore how the Type 094 will “fit” into China’s deterrent force.  
How does a survivable asset change the makeup of China’s deterrent?  Can, and 
ultimately will, China move from minimal deterrence, dictated by a weak arsenal barely 
able to retaliate in a nuclear exchange, to limited deterrence—able to exchange blows in a 
limited nuclear war with a superpower?  It would be easy to only look at this 
development in terms of the United States alone, but this is an oversimplification, Russia 
and India, for example also play a large role in this development.  The British also 
employ ballistic missile submarines, traditionally against Russia (former Soviet Union) 
and to what benefit?  Can some benefits, due to the British decision to only employ 
SSBNs, be highlighted and applied to the benefits Beijing desires to reach?  However, the 
British employ top of the line submarines—with a long history of operations, how good 
does the Type 094 have to be to reach this level?  With that being said, Type 094 images 
and intelligence has already been released, can a preliminary review of these sources 
validate the claims of the Type 094’s capabilities and quieting technologies? 
A. SURVIVABILITY AND DETERRENCE DOCTRINE 
The major benefits of ballistic missile submarine, for any country, are stealth and 
the resulting survivability as a result of that stealth.  How this survivability will relate to 
China’s current policy and deterrence position warrant close review.  Published Chinese 
doctrine will show how nuclear weapons can bolster strategy, beyond simple no-first-use.  
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China will have to decide if they want to capitalize on the options the Type 094 brings.  
Beijing can choose to simply bolster their nuclear policy or evolve their policy to utilize 
the maximum benefits available from a powerful, survivable sea-based nuclear platform.  
Identifying these benefits will ultimately show if China can now engage in “nuclear war 
fighting,” not just nuclear retaliation. 
To begin this discussion, a ballistic missile submarine “benefit baseline” can be 
established.  Specifically, what benefits, not available to land or air based platforms, do 
the Chinese seek from a sea-based nuclear weapon?  The Internal Security Advisory 
Board (ISAB), a senior advisory panel of distinguished experts to U.S. Department of 
State, in a document not intended for public release,27 argued, “holding the U.S. 
homeland hostage to missile attack is important to Chinese military goals.”28   This 
statement is incomplete, and does not begin to cover the scope of Beijing’s efforts.  It 
assumes that the whole purpose behind Chinese nuclear weapons is attacking continental 
United States cities.  This type of simplistic reasoning appears common when any new 
Chinese weapons system débuts: it is simply Beijing trying to catch up to Washington.  
Beijing is seeking to accomplish more with the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile 
submarine.  True, the Type 094 may give the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
the ability attack major American cities—however this is only one, motivation and one 
that China has long held with other forces.  
In the past, China has had questionable relations with nuclear powers other than 
the United States, and they are in the process of a comprehensive military modernization 
program that has encountered recent successes.  The first likely reason for this can be 
understood by examining the benefits the Type 094 will bring in terms of China’s no-
first-use policy.   In order for this policy to be successful: Beijing must hold a survivable 
strategic deterrent.29  Ronald O’Rourke, in a paper he prepared for the United States 
                                                 
27 This document does not represent Department of State (DOS) official policy.  In fact, the document 
was never approved.  It was released by an office in DOS without permission, and then retracted.  Bonnie 
Glaser, e-mail message to author, 7 April 2009. 
28 China's Strategic Modernization, Report from the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) 
Task Force, U.S. Department of State, (September 2008). 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ISAB2008.pdf (accessed 10 June 2009). 
29 An in-depth discussion of China’s “no first policy” will be made in Chapter IV. 
 15
Congress, echoes this; “the [Type] 094 could take the survivability of China’s nuclear 
deterrent to a new level, potentially enabling more aggressive posturing by Beijing in a 
crisis.”30  O’Rourke’s statement can be broken into two parts.  First, it is obvious that a 
“survivable” platform provides the best deterrent.   However, O’Rourke sees the 
downside for the United States: a successful Chinese SSBN program, specifically the 
opportunity for China to “strong-arm” other countries, would increase Chinese influence 
in the region.   
This opinion is not all-inclusive, as other authors see possibility for positive 
outcome.  Toshi Yoshihara and his colleague at the U.S. Naval War College, James R. 
Holmes (a former naval officer), discuss possible benefits. 
The survivability of SSBNs reduces vulnerability to preemption and thus 
eases the temptation for Beijing to adopt a destabilizing nuclear posture 
that undermines crisis stability and escalation control, including through 
increased dispersion and decentralized command and control.31 
Their conclusion that having an SSBN on patrol will keep China from risking nuclear 
escalation (for example putting their land nuclear forces on visual alert during a crisis) is 
a compelling argument.32  If the Type 094 leads to better escalation control, as Yoshihara 
and Holmes insist, will China be more stable actor in a crisis when the Type 094 is on 
patrol?  This question can only be answered in terms of doctrine…how does Beijing view 
nuclear weapons benefits, are they an offensive bargaining tool or the deterrent to all out 
attack? 
A review of Chinese military publications, the Zhanyixue [The science of 
campaigns] and Zhanlüexue [the science of military strategy] provide discussion on this 
topic.  Lt. General Wang Houqing and Maj. General Zhang Xingye, from the National 
                                                 
30 Ronald O’Rourke, “CRS Report for Congress: China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. 
Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. (8 October 
2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112036.pdf (accessed 22 February 2009), 122 & 123. 
31 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, 
Doctrine, and Capabilities.” Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ), Issue 50, (3rd Quarter 2008), 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i50/11.pdf (accessed 22 February 2009), 35. 
32 China’s SSBNs could enhance crisis stability IF they have adequate command and control.  A Big 
IF. Bonnie Glaser, e-mail message to author, 7 April 2009. 
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Defense University in Beijing, argue that the “use of nuclear weapons has a ‘decisive 
influence’ (juedingxing yingxiang; 决定性影响) on the outcome of a war.”33 This 
statement should not be interpreted as China seeking to use nuclear weapons in war, only 
that its ability to use them would likely influence the outcome of the war.  However, by 
leaving the nuclear option “on the table,” these writings may be meant to ensure that 
Chinese wartime leadership is concerned with waging a successful campaign--regardless 
of the no-first-use policy, by considering their most destructive weapons in terms of 
offense and defense.  But how will the Type 094 help the leadership in Beijing wage a 
successful military campaign? Sea based nuclear missiles may provide some benefit in 
war, but it is difficult to accurately assess the value of this type of capability.”  The most 
probable answer is that in war, the most obvious benefit of an SSBN is its ability to force 
an opponent to consider the consequences behind any debilitating or regime changing 
attacks.   
When China is at war, it is difficult to consider that Beijing would not employ 
nuclear weapons as necessary to save the communist regime.  However, this opinion is 
easily debatable.  If the communist regime is fighting a conventional “good fight” their 
population would likely stay behind them.34  At peace, the question of nuclear weapon 
use has been thoroughly discussed, and Beijing has many use options.  Mulvenon and 
Finkelstein explain, “The main Chinese term for deterrence, weishe (威摄), has 
traditionally had a distinctly pejorative connotation, which suggests an explicit effort to 
coerce and terrify an adversary with the threat of force.”35  This definition alone does not 
provide the necessary evidence for judgment on the motivation behind the development 
of the Type 0--094, but it is worth some discussion.  If the motivation behind the Type 
094’s development is linked to Beijing’s desire to use the threat of nuclear weapons as a 
                                                 
33 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye (eds.), Zhanyixue [The science of campaigns], Beijing, Guofang 
Daxue Chubanshe, May 2000, 370.  Quoted in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, “China’s 
Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army.” The CNA Corporation, Alexandria Va. (December 2005), 
http://www.cna.org/documents/doctrinebook.pdf (accessed 23 February 2009), 139.  
34 Bonnie Glaser, e-mail message to author, 7 April 2009. 
35 Mulvenon and Finkelstein, 128. 
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form of coercion and terror, as believed by the ISAB, then it is certainly cause for alarm 
in Washington.  However, this is likely not the case.  China has employed a nuclear 
deterrent for decades, without ever using it to coerce or terrorize another country.36 Given 
the current capabilities, specifically from range estimates of the DF31a, Beijing does not 
need an SSBN to pursue this course of action.  
The more likely scenario is Beijing trying to ensure that its existing deterrence is 
viable.37  Beyond this, Beijing may have the option to implement a new deterrence 
strategy as a result of the Type 094’s existence.  The Zhanlüexue explains four different 
types of deterrence strategy: maximum nuclear deterrence (zuida xiandu he weishe; 
最大限度核威慑); minimum nuclear deterrence (zuidi xiandu he weishe; 
最低限度核威慑); limited nuclear deterrence (youxian heweishe; 有限核威慑); and 
medium strength nuclear deterrence (zhongdeng qiangdu he weishe; 中等强度核威慑).38 
Maximum, limited, and minimum deterrence are important for this example.39  
Maximum nuclear deterrence promises overwhelming nuclear destruction in war. Wang 
Wenrong’s description of maximum nuclear deterrence “appears to be a reference to 
contemporary U.S. nuclear strategy … a ‘perfect strategic defense system’ (wanshan de 
zhanlüe fangyu xitong; 完善的战略防御系统).”40 China is not seeking to employ 
maximum deterrence, as Beijing views this method of deterrence as excessive or 
unnecessary. 
                                                 
36 There is some evidence that top military officials were moving toward a degree of “coercive utility” 
arguing that U.S. officials would be unwilling to “trade” Los Angeles, New York, or San Francisco for 
Taipei.  This view is not in line with Beijing’s no-first-use tradition.  Jason D. Ellis and Todd M. Koca, 
“China Rising: New Challenges to the U.S. Security Posture,” Strategic Forum, No. 175, October 2000.  
(Publication of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University) 
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/elj01/elj01.pdf (accessed 21 May 2009), 2. 
37 The addition of a survivable nuclear asset will allow Chinese decision makers the assumption that 
they will always have nuclear assets, limiting spur of the moment “use them or lose them” tactics.   
38 Wang Wenrong (ed.), Zhanlüexue [Science of military strategy], (Beijing: NDU Press, 1999), 360. 
Quoted in Mulvenon and Finkelstein, 137. 
39 Medium strength nuclear deterrence is mentioned in Zhanlüexue, but this does not appear to be an 
avenue Beijing is pursuing.   
40 Wang Wenrong, 360, quoted in Mulvenon and Finkelstein, 137. 
 18
Throughout its nuclear history it can be argued that China has employed 
minimum deterrence.41  This strategy finds its roots in “Mao Zedong’s writings from the 
1930s, in which” he describes “houfa zhiren: Gain mastery by striking only after the 
enemy has struck first.”42 This strategy is the basis of the no-first-use policy, which is 
one driving force behind China’s decision to employ minimum deterrence.  Zhanlüexue 
offers the modern evolution of this strategy, “In contrast to maximum deterrence … 
minimum deterrence is based on the assumption that an adversary is unlikely to be 
willing to risk facing the consequences of even the most limited nuclear retaliation.”43 
This strategy is based on the assumption that the PLA would lose a major portion of their 
nuclear forces in an initial attack, but still have enough weapons to inflict some minimal 
damage.  Key to this strategy is the argument for limited retaliation.  Unlike maximum 
deterrence, which gives a country no reasonable doubt that they will have forces to 
overwhelm a country if attacked, minimum deterrence offers no guarantee.  It is 
employed because Beijing is currently force limited, and their nuclear second strike 
forces could only give China’s aggressor a “black eye,” not country ending destruction.44 
Limited deterrence is a natural upgrade from minimum deterrence. Alastair Iain 
Johnston, a professor of China in World Affairs at Harvard University, writes,  
Limited deterrence…requires sufficient counterforce and countervalue 
tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of 
conventional or nuclear war.  If deterrence fails, this capability should be 
sufficient to control escalation and to compel the enemy to back down.45    
                                                 
41 Chinese think in terms of quality—for survivability and effectiveness—not in terms of numbers.  
For that reason, the term minimum deterrent is a poor description of China’s nuclear doctrine.  Bonnie 
Glaser, e-mail message to author, 7 April 2009. 
42 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic SEAPOWER: The Politics of Force 
Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1994), 214-215. 
43 Wang Wenrong, 360, quoted in Mulvenon and Finkelstein, 137-138. 
44 In terms of the United States vs. China, if the PLA was to attack a major city or military instillation 
with every surviving nuclear weapon, it would be a setback to United States efforts – but it would not be 
decisive.  If the United States was to attack China with even a tenth of its nuclear forces, China’s 
infrastructure would be damaged to the point that China would not be able to continue a conflict. 
45 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking:’ The Concept of Limited Deterrence” 
International Security, vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96), 5-6. 
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This definition requires careful analysis, it must be clear that the purpose of limited 
deterrence is to deter escalation in nuclear/conventional war not just persuade an 
opponent to question the cost of a first strike.  In terms of Chinese context, this is a great 
departure from minimum deterrence – which has no conventional implications and no 
guaranteed use of nuclear weapons after the retaliatory strike. Two differences are readily 
apparent when analyzing this definition.  First, this strategy requires a large number of 
advanced nuclear forces; Johnston goes on to say, “China does not presently have the 
operational capabilities to implement this vision of limited deterrence.”46  However, he 
goes on to argue that (in addition to other nuclear advancements), “…a larger submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability … will improve the penetrability of 
warheads in the face of space and ground based [ballistic missile defense].”47  And most 
importantly, this strategy is not compatible with China’s no-first-use policy.  Having a 
force designed to deter escalation of conventional war would require the use of nuclear 
weapons in situations currently not endorsed by Beijing.  However, this will expand the 
options available to the Chinese after nuclear war is initiated by another country.  Until it 
is found and neutralized, the Type 094 will provide a platform capable of engaging in 
“nuclear war fighting,” possibly inflicting enough damage to convince their competitor to 
give up, or at the very least lower the conflict back to a conventional level.   
Overall, It is very unlikely that the Type 094 will warrant any shift in Beijing’s 
deterrence stance.  The Type 094 will simply bolster Beijing’s no-first-use policy, giving 
China a reliable second-strike platform when it comes online.48  However, as previously 
mentioned, these technologies are not simply geared toward the United States.  
Understanding why Great Britain decided to employ only ballistic missile submarines 
will offer a better understand of the benefits Beijing will gain.   
                                                 
46 Considering the number and ability of China’s nuclear forces combined with the promised 
adherence to the No-First-Use policy in a conflict, 2nd Artillery forces are not intended for deterring 
conventional attacks against China.  A patrolling SSBN, with a large weapons load out, may shift this 
balance.  Johnston, 6. 
47 Ibid. 
48  A detailed discussion, of the mismatch between the No-First-Use policy and the benefits the Type 
094 brings occurs in Chapter IV.   
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B. GREAT BRITAIN CASE STUDY 
There are several reasons why a study of Great Britain’s nuclear force will lead to 
a better understanding of China’s SSBN procurement.  First, Great Britain’s decision to 
only employ a sea based strategic deterrent isolates benefits and requires justification, 
two things that can be studied independently.  And second, Great Britain employs four 
ballistic missile submarines, a size on par with the expected size of China’s SSBN fleet.49  
Both of these factors, exclusively submarine based systems and small sized fleet will 
yield discussion factors currently unpublished in official Chinese unclassified literature.50  
 This section will review the British nuclear deterrence works of Sir Michael 
Quinlan, who until his death in February 2009, was the Permanent Secretary at the British 
Ministry of Defence.  His work entitled “The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent Force” from July 1980 gives an open discussion on the merits and controversy 
surrounding Britain’s nuclear forces.  This starts with a comparison of London’s strategic 
goals with China, which sets the stage for a brief review of the reasons behind Great 
Britain’s decision to retire their land and air nuclear forces.  With this decision made, 
Quinlan offers a comparison of other nuclear forces and submarines.  In keeping with the 
relevant topic at hand, Britain’s concern with missile defense is also highlighted. 
To discover the reason behind Britain’s sole use of the SSBN as their strategic 
deterrent, an understanding of London’s overall strategic goals is necessary.  Deterrence 
is key, with the purpose of “[influencing] the calculations of a potential aggressor 
decisively before he embarks at all—even with non-nuclear weapons—on 
aggression.”51,52  Quinlan explains what is necessary to make this strategy work in his 
                                                 
49 The type 094 numbers debate will be discussed in Chapter III. 
50 This is not to say that China is moving to a submarine only nuclear force.  The advantages of land 
based nuclear weapons, specifically against strategic competitors other then the United States, will justify 
their employment for the foreseeable future. 
51 It is important to see the differences between British nuclear deterrent strategy and the Chinese 
doctrine of minimum nuclear deterrence.  Unlike minimal deterrence, which is only intended do cause 
damage after an attack, British deterrence strategy is intended to control escalation, before and after an 
attack. 
52 The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, The Defence Council, Ministry of 
Defence, Defence Open Government Document 80/23, July 1980, 2. 
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assertion that, “The best way to ensure this is to put plainly before any possible aggressor 
a clear chain of immense risk, outweighing any advantage he could hope to gain.”53 The 
wording, and specifically the use of the word immense, is important.  Upon first glance, it 
appears as if Britain is overly optimistic: how could a small country, with one nuclear 
submarine on patrol armed with sixteen missiles, pose the Soviet Union an immense risk?  
The answer to this question is an important takeaway; the size of the nuclear arsenal is of 
little importance when considering the power of one survivable nuclear weapon. 
Quinlan describes it in this manner, “The nuclear strengths of Britain … may 
seem modest by comparison with the superpower armouries, but the damage [it] could 
inflict is in absolute terms immense.”54  When comparing numbers of weapons it is easy 
to forget that just one Trident missile, employed on British SSBNs, can kill millions of 
people.   When viewed in terms of China’s strategic competition with the United States, 
this becomes more important. In contrast to the United States, the required damage 
needed to be inflicted by the British on the Soviet Union was much higher, Quinlan 
explains, “Its history, outlook, political doctrines and planning all suggest that its view of 
how much destruction would constitute intolerable disaster might differ widely from that 
of most NATO countries.”55  The British believed that one nuclear submarine on patrol 
was enough to persuade a large communist country, with hundreds of nuclear warheads, 
reason not to attack them conventionally or by nuclear means.56 
Since the British only needed a small force, why decide on submarines and not a 
simpler, more easily controlled deterrent?  London dismissed both the air- and land-based 
options for different reasons.  An aircraft based option was actually in the British arsenal 
until the early 1970s when it was retired.  This air option was dismissed for a number of 
reasons; the following is applicable to a discussion of China: 
                                                 
53 The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, 5. 
54 Ibid., 4. 
55 Ibid., 5. 
56 It is important to note that Great Britain and France believed that if nuclear war erupted in Europe, 
the United States would quickly join to counter Chinese nuclear forces.  A small nuclear force reflects this 
reality.  Therefore there is no correlation between Britain and China’s force size decisions, as the Britain 
nuclear model is intended to isolate benefits from ballistic missile submarines, not add to the force/size 
debate. 
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Aircraft capable of launching strategic missiles need major airfields.  The 
number of such airfields in Britain is limited and their positions are 
known…and we would not wish to have no alternative but to regard 
strikes on such airfields as compelling the final launch of our ultimate 
capability.57 
Clearly, air-based strategic weapons (primarily gravity bombs) were not going to work 
for the British, and Beijing likely has similar feelings.  While China is certainly much 
larger than Great Britain, the advancements in satellite imaging have made the likelihood 
of unknown airfields slim.  In addition, the level of precision found in today’s 
conventional weapons makes any hope of airfield survivability in any conflict limited.   
Mobile land and silo based ballistic missiles are another option that London 
dismissed.  The defense council argued, “No ground-launched force based in Britain 
could achieve the special standard of invulnerability to surprise attack appropriate for our 
ultimate strategic capability.”58  This sentiment is amplified when the distance to London 
from Soviet launchers is considered.  However, is the phrase “based in Britain” the key 
point in this argument?  China has a much better chance of hiding and effectively 
deploying mobile missiles due to their vast continent and distance from their potential 
enemy.59 However, recent research, performed by Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, has 
called into question the survivability of any Chinese land-based missiles from an 
American first strike.   
China's current silo-based missiles have little chance of surviving a U.S. 
disarming strike.  In fact, U.S. counter-force capabilities have grown so 
lethal in the past 15 years that the United States has low-casualty options 
— using conventional or low-yield nuclear weapons — for destroying 
China's silo based nuclear force.  Even China's more survivable land-based 
deterrent -- e.g., their mobile medium- and long-range mobile missiles -- 
are far from invulnerable.  China's missile garrisons can be located with 
even publicly available satellite images.  It would be stunning if the 
United States had not devoted substantial intelligence assets to observing 
                                                 
57 The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, 11. 
58 Ibid., 11. 
59 The distance from China to the continental United States is much greater than the distance from 
Russia to the United Kingdom.  However, this is not to imply that Chinese nuclear forces are only intended 
to deter the United States.  The Russia/India factor will be discussed in following chapters. 
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the day-to-day routines at these garrisons, to monitoring the roads that 
mobile missiles use when they ventured out, and most importantly for 
tracking the movement of missiles during exercises.  The Soviets 
recognized the vulnerabilities of mobile missiles and wisely built hundreds 
of missiles and launchers to establish a truly invulnerable force.  U.S. 
technical intelligence gathering has improved since the Cold War; the 
Chinese will need a substantial mobile missile force to generate a truly 
survivable deterrent.60   
This research, which conclusion can certainly be argued, opens the discussion on 
whether or not; Chinese planners should consider their land-based missile vulnerable.61 
While these arguments against aircraft or land-based missiles are convincing and 
certainly in the best interest of London, sea-based systems are far from perfect.  Surface 
based systems offer very little over land-based systems as they are easy to find and nearly 
as expensive as submarines.  According to Quinlan, 
Surface ships compare poorly with submarines.  They are not markedly 
cheaper for a given missile carrying capacity, speed or endurance; they are 
much easier for an enemy to find and track; and any attempt to combine 
the strategic task with others…would pose the problem of conflicting 
operational demands.62 
Beyond this statement, no follow-on discussion of surface deployed weapons occurs in 
the British strategic document.  
Submarine launched missiles offer both benefits and problems that are different 
from other systems.  Ultimately, the British government believed that a Polaris submarine 
on patrol was…“effectively invulnerable to pre-emptive attack and at high readiness.”63  
The idea of invulnerability to pre-emptive attack is unique to submarines.  The 
preemptive attack of a ballistic missile submarine requires more than a simple order from 
a government.  First, the SSBN must be held and tracked at a close enough distance for 
                                                 
60 Daryl G. Press, e-mail message to author, 9 March 2009. 
61 Lieber/Press insights, while valuable, are not shared by the entire community.  Some of their work 
has been widely criticized.  China’s mobile missiles are likely not as vulnerable as they are portrayed to be 
in this article.  However, even if not comprehensively accurate, the authors have highlighted some of the 
vulnerabilities that are relevant to China’s land-based force. 
62 The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, 12. 
63 Ibid., 6. 
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attack.  Second, the attacking platform (likely an attack submarine) must be in receipt of 
orders to attack, and finally, that submarine must make a successful attack.  This entire 
process, which by no means is assured, must be closely coordinated with other attacking 
forces.  When these factors are combined, the benefits of a submarine seem 
overwhelming.  However, this is only one side of the story.  
The British understood that there were threats and worried about the Polaris’ 
ability to penetrate future anti-ballistic missile defenses (BMD) and the “growing Soviet 
competence in anti-submarine warfare (ASW).”64 In mitigating the threats posed by 
ASW and BMD, the deployment location of a ballistic missile submarine becomes 
important.  A country, such as China, may be quick to deploy its SSBNs in locations 
close to their own coastline.  Coastline deployment brings problems and rewards, which 
Quinlin identifies, “Operation around our own shores could make direct protection by our 
own forces against air or submarine attack easier, but it would also be more vulnerable to 
mining.”65  Blue water deployments lower these vulnerabilities, however they bring with 
them a new set of problems, including limited protection from enemy SSNs and 
communication issues.66 
Deployment options rely heavily on the size of force China chooses to produce.  
Britain has decided that four boats are adequate for their deterrent mission.  “Four is the 
minimum needed to sustain without fail at least one always on patrol…A fifth boat would 
also offer a margin of insurance against possible risks, such as a marked relative 
improvement in Soviet ASW or losing a boat by accident or major unforeseen defect.”67  
The decision for four is based on the decision to always have one submarine on patrol, 
adequate to ensure “immense risk” and constant: to control and fears of escalation that 
the quick deployment of an SSBN during a crisis would bring.  In addition, having a 
 
 
                                                 
64 The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, 7. 
65 Ibid., 13. 
66 A detailed discussion of likely type 094 deployment locations will occur in chapter III. 
67 The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, 21. 
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constant at sea presence negates most aspects of missile defense: by decrease the “time-
to-target” and confusing the “axis of attack,” submarine launched ballistic missiles are 
much more difficult for missile defense systems to overcome. 
Overall, the decision by London to employ only ballistic missile submarines has 
led to many benefits, applicable in discussion of Chinese ballistic submarine acquisition.  
Questions remain as to their validity in a world without the Soviet Union, their design 
designated target.   Currently, Britain may be exercising “virtual deterrence.”68  A theory 
meant to summarize Quinlan’s idea, “The deterrent rests…on long-term uncertainties 
rather than near-term probabilities, addressed to whom it may concern.”69  This idea, 
when applied to the Chinese, brings a to light very important point.  The idea that Beijing 
is developing the Type 094 to meet one strategic challenge is incomplete.  There are 
many factors driving Beijing’s decisions to build and deploy the type 094. 
C. TYPE 094 DEVELOPMENT DRIVING FACTORS 
China’s decision to produce the Type 094 is not the result of just one strategic 
problem.  A mono-causal approach, arguing that China’s sole purpose is to hold the 
United States at risk of nuclear attack, is incomplete.   A discussion of non-traditional 
factors, and their importance, is vital for understanding what role the Type 094 will play 
in the future.  Three factors in particular lead directly to a better understanding of the 
likely deployment scheme, mission, and force size.70  First, the research, production, and 
placement of a missile defense shield in Asia is a matter of concern for the Chinese.  
Second, India is an emerging superpower on the cusp of deploying a ballistic missile 
submarine.  Finally, Russia is the most powerful nuclear state in Asia, and will remain so 
for the foreseeable future. 
                                                 
68 A phrase coined by John Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb, WMD Awareness Programme 
(London: Clydeside Press, 2006), 19.  Quoted in Jeremy Stocker, “The United Kingdom and Nuclear 
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69 Michael Quinlan, “The Future of United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons: Shaping the Debate,” 
International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4 (July 2006), 635. 
70 Long-range conventional strike and space must be considered when missile defense is discussed.  It 
is the combination of the three that China is concerned about.  Do to its limited scope, only missile defense 
is discussed in this thesis.  Bonnie Glaser, e-mail message to author, 7 April 2009. 
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The recent decision by the United States to develop and deploy a ‘missile shield’ 
in Asia is surrounded by heated controversy.  China’s concern, in particular, is well 
founded.  According to the Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, Japan 
was the first Asian country to successfully test an intercept missile, in December of 2007, 
with three more tests scheduled for 2010.71  Sha Zukang, a Chinese diplomat currently 
serving at the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs head, 
explained China’s fears almost a decade ago: 
Some advanced TMD systems in development already have the potential 
to intercept strategic missiles. Such systems, once deployed in North-East 
Asia, will turn the region into the forefront of the US NMD system. 
Secondly, to introduce advanced TMD systems into North-East Asia will 
further enhance US capabilities to interfere in regional affairs. This is 
particularly alarming against the backdrop of NATO expansion, NATO's 
new strategic concept and the growing propensity of the US to use military 
force in international affairs. Thirdly, the US-Japanese joint development 
of TMD systems will accelerate Japan's pace of re-militarisation.72 
Beijing’s perceptions of Washington’s interference in East Asian regional affairs 
and its willingness to pursue military options do not make the introduction of missile 
defense systems seem “defensive.”  Very few topics are discussed as openly and heatedly 
in the Chinese press.  Xinhua, a state sponsored Chinese news group, reports that United 
States’ sponsored missile defense systems, “Spark a new arms race, but also threaten 
security and stimulate nuclear proliferation, instead of promoting security and stemming 
the spread of nuclear weapons.”73  The open deployment of the Type 094, as well as the 
development of other nuclear weapons, is likely a response by China to this perceived 
aggression.   
However, Washington has a different point of view.  Greg May, an author from 
the Nixon Center, explains this sentiment, “To the extent that TMD and NMD can give 
                                                 
71 “Frequently Asked Question (FAQ): Sea-Based Midcourse - Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis 
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Americans and Japanese protection from limited threats, such as those posed by North 
Korean, then missile defense is a worthwhile effort, even if it causes some strains with 
Beijing.”74  Evan Medeiros, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 
explains these strains, “U.S. NMD and TMD policies signs of increasingly hostile US 
intentions toward China…US nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities were 
sufficient to deter attacks from small states like North Korea.”75  This argument is 
bolstered by other lower quality rationales.  The basic argument, that members of the 
Clinton and Bush administrations unofficially implied that an “unintended” positive 
consequence of Asian missile defense was the ability to counter China’s small nuclear 
force, has become a stumbling block for U.S./China relations.76   A more complex 
argument, that the current missile defense shield deployed by Japan and developed by the 
United States is designed to defeat multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles 
(MIRV) and dummy warheads, technologies North Korea will not possess for decades is 
not entirely correct.77  However, some Washington analysts quickly argue this point, May 
explains, “canceling TMD [will not] prevent China from modernizing its missile and 
nuclear forces. China will upgrade its capabilities regardless.”78  Considering the 
strategic advantages provided by their unique survivability, discussed earlier, that 
ballistic missile submarines bring, it is no surprise that Beijing has been researching the 
Type 094 for some time, long before the United States starting selling Japan the ability 
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the shoot down weapons.  But it is the accelerated development, including openly 
releasing Type 094 pictures, are alarming and are likely partially due to Washington’s 
willingness to deploy a missile defense shield.   
In addition to the missile defense shield, regional powers are another factor 
pushing the Type 094 development.  Analysts at the Naval War College attest, 
Beijing must worry about not only a U.S. effort to knock out the Chinese 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force in a Taiwan contingency, 
but also India, a new nuclear neighbor that China shares a long border and 
a tumultuous history with. [And] … despite Russo-Chinese cooperation in 
recent years. How these competing considerations will affect the size and 
operations of the PLAN SSBN force remains to be seen.79 
There are two problems to overcome when trying to prove that China is 
competing with India.  The previous Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice explains the 
first, “There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think 
only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states.  But India is an 
element in China’s calculation.”80  The source of this quote is indicative of the second 
problem: there are multiple sources of U.S. publications that call India and China 
strategic competitors, however there are limited sources available in China that does the 
same.  Publicly, China considers India an economic partner, not a potential military 
adversary.  Baladas Ghoshal, a professor of Southeast Asia studies at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University in India explains, “The imperative for concentrating on development and 
exploring mutually beneficial schemes to promote that development will drive India and 
China to look for ways to develop a partnership based on cooperation and competition.”81  
Given the above discussion, combined with the proximity of both nations and the 
importance they put in the Indian Ocean, it is clear that India and China are in fact 
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strategic competitors, and this competition is partially driving China’s nuclear 
development.  Recently (2008) India’s External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, 
echoes this sentiment describing the rise of China as “a strategic challenge to a rising 
India.”82  Kaplan shows this argument’s relevancy when discussing China’s naval 
modernization, “India’s and China’s great-power aspirations, as well as their quests for 
energy security, have compelled the two countries ‘to redirect their gazes from land to the 
seas.’”83  The Indian Ocean, of great economic and strategic importance to both China 
and India, is at the center of this argument.  There are signs that China has accepted this 
fact. Zhang Ming, a Chinese naval analyst explains, “India is perhaps China’s most 
realistic strategic adversary.”84  Therefore, the consideration of Indian power, as an 
element of competition, will be a useful tool when explaining likely Chinese Type 094 
force size and deployment locations.85 
While it is likely that the Chinese navy will be able to outpace any Indian nuclear 
developments, Russia’s arsenal is simply too large for China to overcome.  However, 
there is no indication that entering an arms race with Russia is in China’s future.  In fact, 
recent military ties, for example the military exercises performed under the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), would point to a strengthened China-Russia bond.  
President Vladimir Putin, in an interview for China’s People Daily, supported this 
rhetoric, "the common point of the national interests of the two countries is established on 
the basis of Russian-China cooperative partnership, the common attitude toward some 
major international issues is the foundation for our strategic cooperation.”86  However 
some authors including Nicklas Norling, a research fellow and managing editor of the 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, argue that the extent of this partnership has major 
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limitations, “It is unlikely that Sino-Russian joint military forces will be used for other 
purposes than intimidation and/or arms demonstrations.”87  The limits of this relationship 
are very important, because the nature of economic, vice defense, allies dictates limited, 
short-term trust and cooperation.88   
China and the United States share many economic ties, yet they still consider each 
other as potential adversaries; it is likely that China and Russia follow this mold as well.  
Chinese planners must consider the idea that China may face Russia in the future.  
Yoshihara and Holmes back up this argument; “Russian sites will almost certainly find 
themselves on the target list for Chinese submarines.”89  This uncertainty, over how 
Russia will impact the development, deployments, and numbers of the Type 094, is not 
easy to deduce. 
How does multiple potential adversaries (for the sake of China: Russia and India) 
affect Beijing’s choice to modernize their nuclear forces with ballistic missile 
submarines? Specific capabilities, most importantly the ability to prepare for nuclear war 
without escalatory telltale signs, are particularly relevant to both cases.  Due to Russia 
and India’s proximity to China a deployed SSBN offers little in the way of a new, or even 
improved, nuclear tactical advantage.  Overall, it is clear that the United States is the 
driving factor behind the Chinese push to develop the Type 094 SSBN.  Other factors, 
including missile defense, India, and Russia are contributing to the development, and will 
likely influence Beijing’s ballistic missile submarine use.  With these issues in mind, new 
questions arise, and the first is: How good does the Type 094 have to be to be successful? 
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D. TYPE 094 REALITIES 
A good estimation of the Type 094’s important characteristics can be made from 
published photographs and reports.  Because of their basic mission: to remain hidden in 
all situations, the most important characteristic of a ballistic missile submarines is their 
emitted noise.   In the press, most estimates of the Type 094 sound signature (noise level) 
are from published pictures, which if analyzed correctly, can provide some qualitative 
comparison.  The proper approach involves breaking down the images into separate 
hydrodynamic design categories.   By looking at obvious design factors, including shape, 
skin friction (sail/surface), flood openings, and propellers a better assessment can be 
made.90  Given the importance of flood openings and propeller design, unique to the 
Type 094, they are discussed at length.  In addition, utilizing estimated speed to 
complement these factors would help narrow the sound estimate.  Overall, many design 
features found on acquired technologies from advanced submarine builders, such as the 
French and Russians, should be considered in use on the Type 094.  
 
Figure 1.   Type 094 Line Drawing91  Source: globalsecurity.org 
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91 Charles P. Vick, “TYPE-094,” www.globalsecurity.org ©2008; JPG, 
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1. Shape   
According to Professor P.N. Joubert, of the Fluids Group, Mechanical and 
Manufacturing Engineering at the University of Melbourne, the classic teardrop 
submarine shape provides measurable noise reductions benefits. 
The ideal form involves a continuously changing diameter along its 
length. The bow would be ellipsoidal and the stern paraboloidal in shape.  
A modest departure from this ideal with a portion of parallel mid-body 
would reduce the draft and the building costs by positive amounts without 
any severe drag and noise penalties.92 
The Type 094, as it appears in the artist rendition in figure 1, is not ideal.   The additional 
height needed for the JL-2 missile certainly imposes noise penalties.  According to 
Jane’s, “[a] characteristic large missile compartment 'hump' at the rear of the fin has a 
detrimental effect on both hydrodynamic performance and flow noise levels.”93  When 
compared to the Ohio-class SSBN (Figure 2), this deficiency becomes clear. 
 
Figure 2.   Ohio/Type 094 Comparison94  Source: globalsecurity.org 
2. Skin Friction (Sail/Surfaces) 
The large sail, visible on the Type 094 will result in a higher sound signature than 
a smaller design would have brought.  Joubert explains, “Skin friction is minimised by 
keeping the sail as small as possible. The skin must be as smooth as possible with no 
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obtrusive edges, joins or holes.”95  As shown in Figure 2, the size of the sail on the Type 
094 is proportionally double that of the Ohio class SSBN.  One positive, helping to 
reduce noises associated to friction is the incorporation of “advanced composite materials 
… credited with capability to absorb vibrations and sound.”96  These materials are in use 
on all modern submarines, and certainly enhance the Type 094 sound absorption 
capabilities.   
3. Flood Openings 
In addition to the sail, the visible flood openings seen below the missile hatches in 
figure 3, will contribute to an increased sound signature. According to Joubert:  
Flood openings and holes in the hull and casing represent a measurable 
and unwanted source of noise and drag. The sail and casing can contain a 
large amount of water, which has an adverse effect on stability when 
surfacing until it drains…Induced fluctuations of flow in and out of the 
hole due to variations of the stagnation point on the edge of the hole facing 
upstream cause fluctuating eddies as is arranged deliberately on a flute or 
organ pipe. Resonance can then accentuate the problem. While shutters 
may prevent this, their mechanical complication gives rise to other 
problems.97 
As can be seen from the picture below, there are numerous flood openings on the 
Chinese boat. The reason behind these openings is unclear.  World War I and II boats 
were required to submerge very quickly, make flood holes necessary.98  A situation 
where the Type 094 would need to submerge quickly is highly unlikely.  This is not an 
uncommon design feature however, as it was also found on the Russian Delta III SSBN, 
although it was almost completely phased out with the upgraded design of the Delta IV in 
1985.99  
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Figure 3.   Type 094 Flood Openings100  Source: sinodefense.com 
4. Propeller 
No photos of the propeller have been released in the open press.  However, there 
is no reason to believe that the propeller will not incorporate an advanced design, likely 
to rival all modern submarines.  According to O’Rourke’s report to Congress: 
PRC scientists have long been conducting research concerning the 
fundamental sources of propeller noise. For instance, experts at China 
Ship Scientific Research Center developed a relatively advanced guide-
vane propeller by the late 1990s. This, and the fact that China already has 
advanced seven-blade propellers with cruciform vortex dissipaters on its 
indigenous Song-class and imported Kilo-class diesel submarines, 
suggests that the [Type] 093 and [Type] 094 will have significantly 
improved propellers.101 
A seven blade modern propeller, with attached vortex dissipaters, will give the Type 094 
a distinct sound advantage over the Russian Delta class submarines previously discussed.   
Overall, based on visual qualitative analysis comparison, the Type 094 is likely 
much louder than the super quiet Ohio.  It has a large sail, deviates from the ideal shape, 
and includes vents.  An advanced propeller will mitigate, but not eradicate these 
problems.   
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However, this is not to say that the Type 094 is going to be a loud platform 
overall; it is likely a small step ahead of the Delta III SSBN.  It is important to consider 
that the average speed of an SSBN on station is less than five knots; comparisons made in 
terms of attack boats, which travel in excess of 15 knots have limited applicability.  
According to reports, the Delta III registered between 125-130 dB at 4-8 knots, the likely 
speed of an SSBN on patrol.102  Considering modern propeller design, this correlates 
with certain Chinese reports, which argue that the Type 094’s acoustic signature was 120 
dB. 103  According to E.V. Miasnikov, Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Arms 
Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and 
Technology, a very quiet submarine registers about 100 dB, a quiet submarine about 120 
dB, and a loud submarine about 140 dB.104  If the Type 094 puts out 120 dB at sea, it will 
be very difficult to track.  When the limitations of using one platform (SSNs) to track the 
Type 094 are considered, the United States Navy will have to make adjustments.   The 
Type 094 will be a quiet platform, released at the opportune moment in United States 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) decline.  
E. TYPE 094 EXPECTATIONS  
China’s first ballistic missile submarine, the Type 092 Xia-class, was never 
considered to be a survivable deterrent.  The product of “trial and error” (many onboard 
systems have been upgraded and tested at sea) the Type 092 spends little time away from 
the pier.105  Is the Type 094 a large improvement over the Type 092?  Two schools of 
thought attempt to answer this question.  The first school contends that planners in 
Washington assume that the Type 094 will be plagued with quality issues, lack sufficient 
quieting, and overall be a small improvement over the Type 092.  The second school of 
thought maintains that the Type 094 will incorporate the quality and quietness of the 
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Type 093, providing an effective second-strike capable weapon.  Upon first glance, it is 
likely that the Type 094, when put to sea will fall somewhere in the middle of this scale. 
The Type 094 must overcome “basic” ASW tactics traditionally used against a boomer 
(ballistic missile boat “slang”).  Attack boat trailing, helicopter dropped sonabuoys, 
satellite surveillance, and underwater arrays are the “maximum” spread of options 
utilized during the Cold War.  If the Type 094 is vulnerable and unreliable like the Type 
092, a minimal (ASW) effort will be required.  If, on the other hand, the Type 094 is as 
(or nearly as) capable as the Type 093 than maximum, cold war level, effort is required.  
However, what if the Type 094 falls somewhere in the middle?  Could there be a 
“medium” level ASW effort available, that Washington can employ, to counter the Type 
094?  
The answer to this question is no: when the Type 094 deploys the United States 
must employ maximum, cold war effort, to contain it.  In port, or surfaced, a submarine is 
vulnerable to a first strike attack, and the Type 092 never moved beyond this stage.  The 
Type 094 is based on the successful Type 093 class, making the likelihood of limited at-
sea ops minimal.  The value of an SSBN goes up exponentially when it is at sea, 
regardless of its sound signature.  This reasoning is simple, yet not widely discussed.  
Once at sea there are a limited number of platforms capable of finding and tracking an 
SSBN on patrol.  There is no guarantee that these platforms will actually find the SSBN, 
only a probability.  The more assets and efforts used, the higher the probability of 
detection and tracking.  However, even when tracked, an SSBN is not neutralized: they 
maintain the ability to launch at least one missile before destruction.  Since the JL-2 may 
be MIRV capable, as many but not all sources suggest, one missile will carry enough 
destructive power to accomplish Beijing’s intentions.106  However, to achieve full 
benefit, China must minimize the probability of detection. 
Basic assumptions must be made to correctly assess the level of quieting desired 
by Beijing for the Type 094.  The first assumption is a Chinese belief that the United 
States will attempt to track the Type 094 when it is at sea.  Roy Kamphausen, Vice  
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President for Political and Security Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research and 
Dr. Andrew Scobell, formerly from the Strategic Studies Institute for the US Army War 
College agree,  
The combination of close contacts with the Russian navy and the growing 
body of unclassified studies on Cold War naval operations must have 
made it abundantly clear to PLA planners that unless PLAN SSBNs can 
operate undetected by U.S. forces, it would be risky to make substantial 
investments in a sea-based leg of their nuclear retaliatory capability.107 
To produce a boat on par with Russian quieting standards is likely beyond Chinese 
industry ability.  The Russian program benefited from years of research combined with 
at-sea operations.  This basic “hands-on” experience has yet to be gained by the Chinese; 
coming late to the operational SSBN game will certainly hurt Beijing’s efforts.  However, 
this does not mean that the Type 094 will not able to elude enemy SSNs.  One issue, 
specifically the U.S.’s (or any competitor’s) ability to track the Type 094, is problematic.  
The United States was at the peak of its ASW abilities when it tracked Soviet SSBNs; 
does that ability still exist? 
According to Yoshihara and Holmes, “America’s nuclear attack submarine fleet 
and ASW aviation squadrons—the most potent counters to an undersea threat—have 
atrophied in numbers, at rates that many believe will take decades to reverse.”108  This 
decrease is combined with another reduction: anti-submarine warfare practice.  Practice 
develops the skills necessary to carry out strategic ASW.  LT Christopher McConnaughy, 
Chief of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Quality Assurance at the United States 
Strategic Command, highlights the challenges these skills, “Strategic ASW requires SSNs 
to shadow SSBNs, to track them continuously, utilizing cues from such sources as 
satellite imagery, antisubmarine aircraft, and fixed, passive underwater acoustic 
arrays.”109    
                                                 
107 Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, “Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the 
Contours of China’s Military,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2007, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB784.pdf (accessed 22 February 2009), 512. 
108 Yoshihara and Holmes, 35. 
109 McConnaughy, 90. 
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This quote emphasizes the difficulties that the United States will face if they 
attempt to track the Type 094.  The United States will receive limited benefits from the 
“cues” McConnaughy mentions.  First, the submarine base on Hainan Island has 
underwater entry and exit, if China bases the Type 094 from this Island, in port satellite 
imagery becomes impossible.  Second, the aging P-3 Orion fleet, with an average service 
life of 26 years, has been over tasked with an “airborne battlefield observation platform” 
conducting mission in both Afghanistan and Iraq.110  These missions, while well within 
the capability of the airframe, have taken valuable ASW training time away from the 
pilots.  Further, the P-3 is an aged technology.  The P-3 replacement, the Multimission 
Maritime Aircraft (MMA), based on the Boeing 737, will not enter service until 2013.  
Finally, existing SOSUS arrays, for example the array reported to be close to Diego 
Garcia, offer only limited detection ability.111 
Without cues, SSNs will have to carry the brunt of detection and tracking work.  
Given the previously discussed drawdown in numbers, increased non-ASW missions, and 
minimal aircraft/array/satellite help the current number of United States submarines may 
have a difficult time providing numbers to track the Type 094.112  Still, the task of 
assessing the level of quiet achieved by the Type 094 is very important.  The technologies 
employed could help shape future U.S. technology purchases. 
F. CONCLUSION 
When the Type 094 class is fully operational, China will have a survivable 
nuclear strategic deterrent.  China will have the opportunity to use this technology in 
previously unavailable ways, making their worldwide influence increase.  It will also 
bring the opportunity for limited crisis stability.  Unlike ground-based weapons, which 
visibly indicate escalation, readying SSBNs during a crisis does not effect negotiations.  
                                                 
110 “U.S. Announces P-3 Orion Replacement: Boeing MMA,” Associated Press, 15 June 2004, 
http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-1726.html (accessed 31 March 2009). 
111 William Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security, (New York: Berkeley 
Books, 1988), 172. 
112 The missions of U.S. submarines have grown since the end of the Cold War.  There use as a 
platform for land attack has limited their ASW practice. 
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The Type 094 addition allows for a shift from minimum deterrence, employed by a 
country with questionably survivable nuclear assets, to limited deterrence, where nuclear 
weapons play a greater role in diplomacy.  Great Britain, a country that employs SSBNs 
alone, has long reaped their benefits, which will soon be shared by the Chinese.  Upon 
first glance, it does not appear that the United States will be ready to face this challenge, 
give the currently available design aspects and expectations.  The Type 094 will be a 
capable quiet platform with a sound signature near 120 dB.  A ballistic missile 
submarine, on par with the Los Angeles-class quieting, will require Cold War level ASW 
capabilities, an issue taken up in the conclusion.  The required extent of these capabilities 
can only be known when the Type 094 operating patterns are discovered.  The following 
chapter will address the question of how will China employ the Type 094.   
 40
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III. TYPE 094 BASING AND NUMBERS 
The tactics China uses to deploy the Type 094 are extremely important.  The level 
of threat against the mainland United States depends almost entirely on the distance away 
from the coastline Beijing is willing send the Type 094.  Given the early stage of the 
Type 094’s program development, and the fact that it has never performed a deterrent 
patrol, careful speculation, based on the program and published reports, is required.  A 
good starting point for this is analyzing whether it is likely for the CPC to deploy the 
Type 094 conservatively or boldly.  Such confidence, built by at-sea training, may 
embolden Chinese decision makers – making them more likely to pursue deployment and 
mainland U.S. targeting options that the West is routing against.  This “bold” conclusion 
will entirely depend on a number of decisions the leadership in Beijing will face when the 
Type 094 comes online.   
In order to identify the basing, numbers, and deployment options available to 
Beijing a specific analysis of each area will provide the best comprehensive review.  To 
accomplish this, the chapter will first address the benefits and disadvantages associated 
with small and large SSBN class sizes – to find the likely force size Beijing will employ.  
The chapter will follow this with an examination of the deployment options available for 
the Type 094: either a bastion style strategy – where they deploy close to home under an 
air and surface cover, or an open ocean deployment strategy – relying on the Type 094s 
stealth to hide from potential enemy ASW.  And finally, a future target set, focused 
specifically on the nuclear threat the Type 094 can bring to the U.S. sovereignty, will 
illuminate the shortcomings of each strategy, or combinations of strategies available to 
Beijing for use.  
A. FUTURE NUMBER ESTIMATES 
Numbers play an important part in the success of any weapon, but are especially 
important for complex weapon systems like submarines.  For several reasons, the 
effectiveness of the Type 094 as a deterrent will be directly related to the number of 
submarines built.  This section will first analyze how a low volume production run of 
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submarines tend to be hampered by supply and maintenance issues.  Second it discusses 
how the ability to have an SSBN at sea at all times requires at least four submarines; a 
smaller squadron of boats will inevitably lead to a smaller target/mission set.  And 
finally, a small squadron faces an increased risk from enemy ASW, as the ratio of enemy 
SSNs to SSBN goes up.  For background, this section builds on Ronald O’Rourke’s 
Congressional Research report, which estimates the Type 094’s class size to be five or six 
submarines.113  These estimates are important, but only a starting point, and warrant 
analysis to determine if they are correct.  When benefits of building five or six 
submarines versus only two or three (the amount imaged at this time) are compared, the 
basis for these popular arguments becomes evident.114   
The first argument for a Type 094 class size of 5-6 is based on economics. Small 
class projects, such as the U.S. Navy’s Seawolf class SSN, are inherently more expensive 
per unit than large run ships, such as the Los Angeles class SSN.   This is for two basic 
reasons.  First, the price of “subsequent” ships decreases as the numbers increase, and 
second, the price of ship maintenance for a smaller class of ship is higher than for a larger 
class of ship (per unit).  Christopher Drew, a New York Times editor often critical of 
American shipbuilding and naval procurement, explains how numbers can affect cost 
initially (for the Zumwalt class destroyers): 
Pentagon officials had estimated that the first of the new destroyers, also 
known as the Zumwalt class, would cost $3.3 billion, with additional ships 
costing at least $2.5 billion each if the Navy had built the 10 that were 
originally planned…But if only the three are built, independent analysts 
said, various economies of scale would be lost, and the average cost could 
rise to $5 billion or more.115 
In addition to initial build expenses, maintenance and part replacement costs for 
low run platforms are often higher than high run platforms.  Due to the “must be ready to 
                                                 
113 O’Rourke,120-121. 
114 Only two Type 094 “Jin” class SSBNs have been imaged together in port.  In this image there 
appears to be a third submarine, although its class is unknown.  For the purpose of this thesis, the difference 
between two and three has little effect on deployment patterns.  Until the number reaches four, a constant 
at-sea presence is not feasible.   
115 Christopher Drew, “Contractors Reach Deal on Destroyer,” The New York Times, 8 April 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/business/09defense.html?_r=1andemc=eta1 (accessed 8 April 2009). 
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deploy” nature of submarines, low number platforms often lead to debilitating part 
sharing.  In larger fleets, problem areas are quickly identified and high need parts are 
mass-produced, reducing the amount of down time pier side.  Even in the United States, 
with their world leading military budget, struggles with this phenomenon.  For example, 
the Seawolf, SSN-21, has been dubbed the “pierwolf” or “building 21” by some 
submarine sailors, for its tendency to be stuck in port because parts are unavailable or in 
use on the SSN 22 and 23.  Without question, a larger Seawolf class size would increase 
readiness.  Readiness is cumbersome, but can be overcome for SSNs: critical missions 
can be delegated to other boats if an attack boat is delayed prior to deployment, however, 
for SSBNs it can destroy their deterrent potential.  If the Chinese maintain a fleet of 2-3 
Type 094s, it will likely suffer the same issues as the Seawolf class.  PLAN forces will 
likely have to scavenge from one submarine to keep the other running.  If this is the case, 
then it will be impossible for a Type 094 to be at sea at all times. 
A second argument, based on a constant at sea presence, is explained in terms of 
Beijing’s goal for the Type 094.   On deterrent patrol, the Type 094’s second-strike 
ability will greatly bolster the validity of the no-first-use policy.  The addition of a new 
sea-based platform challenges competitors, specifically the United States, to develop new 
ways to account these weapons.  There is a point at which Washington must assume a 
degree of vulnerability to a Chinese retaliatory strike.  This vulnerability tipping point, in 
terms of SSBNs, is directly proportional to the number of platforms produced.  The more 
platforms China has at sea, the greater the likelihood of retaliatory attack.  According to 
O’Rourke, “the U.S. Navy has assessed that China might build as many as five Jin-class 
submarines in order to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-
sea SSBN presence.”116  Given China’s problems with the Type 092, redundancy and 
quality must be a key feature of China’s plans. 
Quality control in construction and maintenance will determine if five to six 
ballistic missile submarines will be enough to maintain a constant at sea presence.  
Keeping an SSBN at sea around the clock is not a simple undertaking.  Maintaining this 
                                                 
116 O’Rourke, 120–121. 
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presence at sea will put an uncommonly large amount of pressure on the Type 094 fleet 
leadership.  This pressure may lead to compromises in quality control and maintenance 
practices – raising the likelihood of catastrophic at-sea failure.117  In addition, unlike the 
United States, which goes into “safe mode” by putting all underwater assets into 
lockdown until the leadership feels problems have been resolved, Beijing may be 
inadvertently causing the opposite.  In the wake of the loss of a Ming class diesel 
submarine in April 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao, “urged the People's Liberation 
Army to draw a lesson from a deadly submarine accident and speed up its modernization 
drive.”118  Urging the submarine force to “speed up” modernization may not lead to the 
effect intended.119  While President Hu was likely trying to spur the military community 
into replacing old technology (such as the Ming class), this push may produce submarines 
that are developed and produced too quickly – leading to low platform quality standards.   
The third and final aspect to any evaluation of fleet size is that numbers are of 
vital importance in submarine warfare.  The first two arguments discussed above focus on 
the need to maintain one submarine at sea at all times to validate their at-sea nuclear 
deterrent.  Other considerations are also important.  Yoshihara and Holmes highlight a 
different argument for this case: 
Assuming 50 percent of the at-sea SSBNs fell prey to enemy ASW—a 
generous estimate in view of the SSBN capacity for concealment and quiet 
operations—only two Chinese SSBNs would need to be at sea at any 
given time to ensure that one survived a first strike. Based on the rotating 
deployment cycle described above, China would need six SSBNs to fulfill 
the basic demands of minimum deterrence.120 
                                                 
117 Casualty response will be closely examined in Chapter IV.   
118 “China's Hu Says PLA Should Learn from Sub Disaster,” Reuters, 4 May 2005, 
http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/articles/other/MingSub.htm (accessed 10 April 2009). 
119 This is not to imply that the Chinese leadership are not concerned with safety.  The PLAN 
leadership, ultimately responsible for the Ming accident was seriously reprimanded for their role in the 
tragedy.  This is a trend that is likely to continue, lead to better maintenance practices and fewer at-sea 
losses.   
120 Yoshihara and Holmes, 36. 
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Yoshihara and Holmes 50% survivability rate is likely an approximation given the lull in 
United States ASW practice and training.121  It is important to note that if only one Type 
094 survives enemy ASW attacks in a time of crisis, China will retain the ability to fire 
12 JL-2 missiles in a response to nuclear attack. 122 
Overall, the benefits of having a fleet of five to six Type 094 submarines with the 
ability to maintain a constant at sea presence are clear.  As discussed, the cost per 
submarine decreases with every new submarine in the class, with needed maintenance 
parts become more common in the supply chain.  Greater numbers also increase the Type 
094’s viability because it will be able to maintain a constant at-sea basis.  Or, if a bastion 
strategy is used, multiple ballistic missile submarines can be used to overwhelm lurking 
SSNs.  However, the likelihood of maintaining that presence is nearly non-existent at this 
time.  In the future this may not be the case, once more platforms are built and new-build 
issues have been sorted out with the Type 094 and JL-2. Because of this, it is likely that 
Beijing will deploy the Type 094 in two different ways in its lifetime; it will start with a 
bastion strategy, and when platforms are available, transition to a constant at-sea 
presence.  The next section takes up that discussion. 
                                                 
121 These shortcomings were discussed in detail at the end of Chapter II. 
122 There is speculation on whether or not the JL-2 missile will incorporate Multiple Independently 
Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology.  While this type of development is important to consider, 
for this discussion the destructive power threat of just 12 JL-2 missiles is overwhelming in most regards.  
Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, “China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives On Security, 
Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
September 2002, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB59.pdf (accessed 22 February 
2009), 149. 
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B. DEPLOYMENT TYPE 
Currently, with only two or three Type 094 submarines in service, Beijing will 
likely deploy a bastion strategy when the JL-2 missile is ready for use.123 This strategy 
was developed and employed by the Soviet Union, worried that superior United States 
ASW assets had the ability to track and destroy Soviet SSBNs prior to nuclear launch. 
This strategy involved placing SSBNs in “pens” and protecting them with aviation and 
sea-based assets.  A second option would utilize “open-ocean” deployment.  A constant 
at sea presence makes this option viable – by increasing the likelihood that enemy SSN’s 
will not shadow the Type 094 when it is traveling out of port.   This section will explore 
both options, however it will primarily focus on the bastion strategy since 1) it is the only 
viable option available to Beijing with 2-3 SSBNs and 2) since there has already been 
some “practice” for coordination this strategy requires.   
Bastion-deployed SSBNs maintain their ability to fire-pier side in peace, and can 
transition to a protected at-sea sea location in times of crisis. According to Richard O. 
Fanjoy, an associate professor of Aviation Technology at Purdue University, “These 
bastions, in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea, provide ideal cover for Delta IV and 
Typhoon boats that can either operate under the Arctic ice pack where aircraft and 
surface fleets can't get at them or stay below an umbrella of Soviet air and ASW 
                                                 
123 Some analysts believe that the JL-2 is plagued with problems and running behind schedule.  This 
belief seems to stem from an article written in 2004 for the Washington Times by Bill Gertz where he 
reported that “U.S. intelligence officials said the Chinese suffered a setback in their JL-2 missile program 
when a test flight of the JL-2 missile failed over the summer.  The JL-2 missile program was delayed by the 
test failure but is continuing to be developed, the officials said.” While the test in the summer of 2004 may 
have been a failure, in no way should it be inferred that the JL-2 is not fully operational.  This failed test 
was the third in a series of four. Unlike the United States, it seems as if the 2nd Artillery only tests their 
ballistic missiles a small number of times.  For example, the JL-1 only had 3 test flights in 1985 before 
coming operational in 1987. Overall, given the successful test in 2005, it is likely that the JL-2 is near ready 
for use.  Bill Gertz, “China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine,” The Washington Times, 3 December 2004, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20041202-115302-2338r.htm (accessed 16 April 2009).  A 
planned launch was reported in September 2001, but this was cancelled. The first launch was made from 
the trials submarine in August 2002, with a reported range of 6,000 km. A second flight test was made in 
2003, a third in August 2004, and a fourth in May 2005.  Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems - JL-2 (CSS-
NX-5). 
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protection.”124  China will not have an under ice deployment option; they will have to 
stay under an “umbrella.”  Lyle Goldstein argues for the possibility of a Chinese bastion 
strategy, “It can be said the Soviet ‘bastion strategy’ might have applicability to China, 
even if the Chinese system of layered defenses is more focused on proximate territorial 
disputes then nuclear operations.”  Unless Beijing develops 3-4 more Type 094s before 
the JL-2 comes online, then there is little doubt that a bastion strategy will be applicable 
to China.125  However, a bastion strategy, centered on either the Yellow Sea (Qingdao) or 
Gulf of Tonkin, will allow Beijing to safely utilize a small number of Type 094s, but it 
comes with a list of shortcomings that Beijing must plan to overcome.126 
A bastion strategy comes with inherent problems.  First unlike a hidden, always 
on station SSBN, the bastion strategy requires additional forces to remain viable.  Victor 
Mizin and Michael Jasinski, researchers at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
(CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies explain, “During the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union felt compelled to dedicate considerable effort to construct a large surface 
fleet that would protect the 'SSBN bastions' against NATO naval task forces.”127  Not 
only does it take a large amount of naval forces, often in high demand in a crisis, a 
bastion strategy also requires a great deal of coordination.   
While these considerations are important, nevertheless, it appears as though China 
is already planning for this: 
In mid-November 2007, the PLAN held a complex set of exercises which 
featured the use of new ships and missiles. Located largely in the South 
China Sea near Hainan Island and the Paracel Island group, this exercise 
was a rare joint South Sea Fleet and East Sea Fleet endeavour … This 
                                                 
124 Richard O. Fanjoy, Lt Colonel USAF, “U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy and Soviet SSBNs: 
Optimum Targeting or Escalatory Dilemma,” A paper for Military Strategy Seminar I.  National War 
College, 9 April 1990, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437400&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed 10 June 2009). 
125 This is not to say that China will not employ a unique version of a “bastion” strategy, different 
from the Soviet Union style.  Regardless, there are two options for SSBN deployment, a constant at sea 
presence and a surge doctrine (bastion). 
126 Both the Qingdoa and Gulf of Tonkin bastion advantages and shortcomings are discussed at length 
in section C: Possible home base locations and target speculation. 
127 Victor Mizin and Michael Jasinski, “The Future of the Russian Sea-Based Deterrent,” The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (July/September 2003), 82. 
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exercise also coincided with the first movement of the new Type 094 
SSBN to its new base near Sanya on Hainan Island, perhaps indicating 
that one of the goals of this exercise was to develop doctrine and tactics to 
support SSBNs.128 
Second, even if the tactics are sound, the operations are very costly.  This is the 
second problem with the bastion strategy; it is very expensive. Kamphausen and Scobell 
argue that the Type 094 “would become a resource black hole if the PLA had to create a 
Soviet-like “bastion” defense to protect them.”129  The Soviet Union relied on this 
bastion strategy in the height of the Cold War.  They were aware that their SSBNs were 
vulnerable to American SSNs, deployed the “most modern of [their] surface forces … 
charged with supporting Soviet SSBNs.”130  The Soviets defended their bastion with a 
full range of naval forces in layers.  The inner layer contained SSN's patrolling within the 
bastion.  In the next Surface Action Groups, (SAGs) with several heavy combatants 
patrolled at the perimeter providing aggressive ASW against any and all sub-surface 
contacts.  Further, land based naval patrol aircraft supported ASW and Defensive Counter 
Air (DCA) was provided by fighters.  All four of these options were exercised regularly.  
China, if they decide on a bastion strategy, must also expend a great deal of their surface 
force effort to meet the modern Anti-American SSN challenge.  Complex training 
exercises, like the one held in November 2007, are the first costly step in bastion strategy 
implementation.  
The third and final bastion strategy shortcoming is its inherent escalatory nature. 
If Beijing is in a crisis with another country, and it deploys its SSBNs (even for a routine 
or training mission), it is likely that the competing country will see this as an escalatory 
act.  China, with its ingrained no-first-use policy, has refrained from using nuclear 
weapons in an escalatory or threatening manner, since the successive tests in 1969.  Other 
countries may perceive the deployment of weapons as a signal that Beijing is departing 
from its policy of no-first-use, something that Chinese leadership will likely not risk.  It is 
                                                 
128 “China and Northeast Asia: Navy, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 3 February 2009, 
www.janes.com (accessed 10 April 2009). 
129 Kamphausen and Scobell, 512. 
130 Kenneth R. McGruther, The Evolving Soviet Navy, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1978), 54.   
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possible that Beijing may employ some sort of at-sea scheduling for the Type 094, to 
limit its time in port and deter this appearance of escalation. However, this will greatly 
limit the Type 094’s effectiveness, especially if China must wait until a scheduled time to 
deploy this asset in a time of crisis. (The Type 094 provides new capabilities for nuclear 
signaling in a crisis.) 
China has a unique option, unavailable to the Russians, due to the underwater sea 
base at Hainan Island.  Beijing may be able to covertly deploy the Type 094 in a time of 
crisis, as there will be no indication observable to satellites, a traditional modus oporandi 
in this case, that the Type 094 has left port.  However, this deployment tactic is not 
without fault, in order to be viable, the entrance and exit would have to be done at dark 
(figure 4). The navigational hazards of conning a large submarine through a small 
entrance, with limited tugboat support at night would be a difficult lengthy process.131 
 
                                                 
131 According to www.military-today.com the Type 094 is 133 meters long.  This would make the 
width approximately 11 meters wide.  According to the Federation of American Scientists the opening to 
the submarine cave at Hainan Island is 16 meters wide.  This would give approximately 7 feet of clearance 
on each side of the Type 094 if it were to transit the tunnel.  “Jin Class: Ballistic Missile Submarine,” 
Military-Today, http://www.military-today.com/navy/jin_class.htm (accessed 10 June 2009); “Yulin 
(Sanya) Naval Base: Hainan Island, China,” Federation of American Scientists, DigitalGlobe ©2008; JPG, 
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/images/Hainan-full.jpg (accessed 1 April 2009). 
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Figure 4.   Hainan Island Base132 Source: www.fas.org 
China would also lose the ability to launch the JL-2 pier side, minimizing the 
effectiveness of the Type 094 in a crisis environment.  The underground base also suffers 
from a chokepoint (the small underground entrance), which would be easily destroyed by 
an aggressor in time of a crisis.   In addition, if Beijing decides to utilize a bastion 
strategy, when Type 094 deploys from Hainan, it would still require surface escorts (and 
the associated cost of fuel, personnel and wear associated with bastion operations).  
Hainan Island is also not situated in the ideal location; it greatly reduces the Type 094’s 
targeting choices.133  Overall, the deployment of the Type 094 from underground is a 
large risk for Beijing to take.  
Despite these bastion strategy shortcomings, when available as an asset, Beijing 
will likely deploy the Type 094 in a constant, at sea basis.  This approach has advantages 
over the bastion strategy.  First, additional forces, and their coordination, are not 
                                                 
132 “Yulin (Sanya) Naval Base: Hainan Island, China,” Federation of American Scientists. 
133 The JL-2’s range limitations and likely bastion locations, Qingdoa and Gulf of Tonkin, are 
discussed at length in section C: Possible home base locations and target speculation. 
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required.134  If a submarine is in a bastion with surface and air protection, the location of 
the submarine can be narrowed down to a small, ASW manageable location.  For an 
SSBN, to “hide with pride” is always the easiest strategy.  In addition, a platform that can 
hide effectively has the ability to travel outside of localized bastions.  Kamphausen and 
Scobell briefly explain these added benefits: 
The PRC [would] take advantage of the vastness of the open ocean to 
enhance the survivability of its nuclear deterrent against the United States 
and potentially circumvent U.S. missile defense by being able to launch 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from submarines along 
azimuths outside the engagement zones of antiballistic missile (ABM) 
systems.135 
The most significant benefit gained for China, from a constant at-sea strategy, is the 
ability to peacefully interact with other countries in crisis situations without the risk of 
nuclear escalation.  For clarification, a bastion strategy would alert China’s competitor to 
a rise in the “stakes.”  Specifically, Beijing, by deploying the Type 094 (and associated 
surface protection) during a crisis, would increase the likelihood of the nuclear option.  
This type of signaling is unavoidable in a bastion strategy, however it is the key benefit 
of a constant at-sea strategy.  A constantly at-sea SSBNs can go “on alert” without 
alerting Beijing’s competition, negotiations can continue without escalation. 
It is unclear when China will be able to maintain the Type 094 constantly at sea.  
Some analysis believes that even when China has this ability, it may break away from the 
mold and pursue a different avenue. Yoshihara and Holmes argue for a hybrid: 
Chinese may keep their options open, alternating among them as security 
conditions warrant. For example, Beijing may be content to rely on a 







                                                 
134 Beijing may choose to deploy the Type 094 with an attack boat shadow or screen.  This would 
have an adverse affect on the Type 094 stealth as two boats would be easier to find than one. 
135 Kamphausen and Scobell, 512. 
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times of conflict, it may permit more active coastal patrols or slip its 
SSBNs into open waters to signal resolve or counter nuclear coercion from 
an adversary.136 
However, this argument is based on the belief that in a crisis China will have the ability 
to “slip” an SSBN into open waters.  If that crisis is with a country with a viable SSN 
force, such as the United States, the ASW tracking risk becomes very high.  If an 
adversary has the knowledge of impending SSBN deployment, it is likely they will do 
everything to track and neutralize it.  China adopting a peacetime deployment routine, to 
an unknown location is the most viable way to ensure second-strike capability. 
C. POSSIBLE HOME BASE LOCATIONS AND TARGET SPECULATION 
Determining the basing locations of Type 094s requires dynamic estimation.  
There is a great likelihood that the basing will change as additional Type 094s are 
commissioned.  Because of this, the basing of the Type 094 should be considered for 
each separate deployment type.  Due to location, likely targets become apparent based on 
the JL-2s estimated range.137  For the purpose of the arguments posed in this chapter, the 
assumed range of the JL-2 missile will be set at 8,000km (4320 miles).  This range is 
used for two reasons, first the JL-2 is relatively untested and therefore the estimate used 
in the 2007 China’s Military Power annual report to Congress is a widely accepted 
approximation.  And second, even if the JL-2’s range is closer to 12,000 km as some 
estimate, it is unlikely that Beijing would be willing to employ this weapon close to its 
maximum range.  This type of employment would increase the likelihood of system 
failure, associated with operating weapon systems near their limits.  Figure 5 is a map 
with range estimates for various Chinese weapon systems.  This will provide an adequate 
starting point for discussion on the effect that location will have on the Type 094’s 
credibility and effectiveness.     
                                                 
136 There is another cost associated with this type of strategy.  The submarine force (and associated 
surface forces) would have to train for two separate missions.  One would be learning how to work closely 
with surface operations; the other would be using stealth to hide from aggressor ASW forces.  Yoshihara 
and Holmes, 37. 
137 According to Janes, the actual maximum range of the JL-2 is not known.  The estimates range from 
7,200km (4474 miles) to 12,000km (7456 miles).  Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems - JL-2 (CSS-NX-5). 
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Figure 5.   China Missile Rangers138 Source: www.defenselink.mil 
Upon initial review, it seems as if the JL-2 will hold portions of the continental 
United States at bay when it is employed.  However, the range rings for the various 
missile systems are based on a China centered location, inapplicable for the sea-based 
Type 094.  Updating the chart, based on expected basing and deployment locations, will 
provide a better basis for analysis. 
As previously alluded to, there are good indications that China is preparing to 
deploy the Type 094 from Hainan Island to a bastion south of the Gulf of Tonkin.  This 
conclusion is based on available open source reports.  First, as shown in Figure 1, the 
                                                 
138 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007,(Image copied 
from PDF.) Department of Defense, 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-
Power-final.pdfp. (Accessed 14 April 2009), 19. 
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Type 094 has already been imaged at the Yulin Naval Base.139  Second, the November 
2007 Chinese naval exercise, which reportedly included the Type 094, occurred near this 
location.140  And finally, the Gulf of Tonkin, due to its nature as a gulf, provides a 
protected area ideal for a bastion.  However, the Gulf of Tonkin does have disadvantages, 
and the first of these is based on the expected range of the JL-2. 
 
Figure 6.   JL-2 Range Adjusted for Hainan Bastion141 Source: www.defenselink.mil 
Figure 6 illustrates the problem of having a bastion strategy centered on Hainan 
Island.  Although the figure is only intended to show general ranges, based on an 
expected JL-2 range of 8,000 km, it still clearly shows the problem with a bastion located 
                                                 
139 According to Hans M. Kristensen, “The first boat was launched in 2004 and first disclosed by FAS 
in July 2007 at Xiaopingdao Submarine Base Submarine Base near Dalain via a commercial satellite image 
taken in October 2006. Another sattelite image taken in May 2007 and first described in October 2007 
showed two partially assembled Jin-class SSBNs at Bohai Shipyard near Huludao. Whether China at that 
point had launched two or three boats remains unclear.”  Hans M. Kristensen, “Type 094 (Jin-class) 
SSBN.” Federation of American Scientist, The Nuclear Information Project, 24 April 2008, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/slbm/type_94.htm (accessed 7 June 2009). 
140 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China And Northeast Asia: Navy, China.   
141 Original ranges based on center of China.  Image edited by author.  Original image produced for  
Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007. 
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near Hainan and the Gulf of Tonkin.  The JL-2 will not be able to threaten sites in the 
continental United States.  However, it may be able to threaten sites in Alaska and 
Hawaii; a smaller but still credible threat.  A good question to ask may be whether the 
United States is willing to trade Taipei for Honolulu?  Overall, a bastion strategy near 
Hainan Island is initially very likely.  For the initial deployments of the Type 094, China 
may be willing to forgo the ability to attack the continental United States (while 
threatening U.S. allies and territories, specifically Japan, Guam, and South Korea) in 
order to perfect the training and employment of a bastion strategy.  If Washington does 
not feel threatened by the Type 094, then it is less likely resources will be allocated to 
track it.  
David Isby, a Jane’s Information Group submitter, sees the Type 094 being based 
in places other than Hainan: 
According to unconfirmed press reports, China's nuclear ballistic missile 
(SSBN) submarines are based with the 1st Submarine Flotilla of the North 
Sea Fleet, located near Qingdao in Shandong Province … the base 
includes hardened cave-type submarine pens and five berths.  A dock with 
a crane suitable for missile loading has also been built, while the 
infrastructure includes hardened missile storage and large buildings, 
possibly for missile checkout and assembly.142 
This is a strong argument for this location.  Employing multiple bastions will give 
Beijing deterrent flexibility, however the cost of this type of deployment and the 
availability of defensive surface assets is questionable. This allows the ability to keep 
regional competitors in check while threatening (although minimally) areas of the United 
States.  Figure 7 gives JL-2 range estimates for a Yellow Sea (Qingdao) bastion.  By 
using this Department of Defense chart, modified for a Yellow Sea bastion, it is evident 
that all of the major urban areas on the Western seaboard are threatened.  From a 
defensive point of view, the Yellow Sea offers the best bastion setting.  It is shallow, easy 
to defend, and clearly in China’s territorial waters. 
                                                 
142 David C. Isby, “China’s SSBN is based with 1st Submarine Flotilla near Qingdoa, claim reports,” 
Jane’s Missiles and Rockets Information Group, 1 Nov 2006, www.janes.com (accessed 14 April 2009). 
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Figure 7.   Range Adjusted for Yellow Sea Bastion143 Source: www.defenselink.mil 
It is clear that the Yellow Sea and Hainan Island are likely bastion locations, 
however both have distinct disadvantages.  First, attacking continental United States 
targets in either case would likely require Russian airspace over-flight.  Given the 
discussion in chapter 2, a strategic competitor such as Russia may not be willing to allow 
this course of attack.  Second, operation of ballistic missiles at their maximum range 
increases the likelihood of failure. An increase in the failure of a second strike weapon 
begins to negate China’s nuclear deterrence validity.  Given these shortcomings, it 
becomes apparent that the Type 094 may be employed in deep-water open ocean settings. 
Employment of the Type 094, outside of China’s regional waters, is the most 
logical course of action for Beijing.  Practicality may win out over logic, as the risk from 
enemy SSNs goes up considerably if the Type 094 travels outside of regional waters.  
O’Rourke contends that, “The future mission of the [Type 094] appears to be regional 
because the range of the missiles and operational constraints facing the submarines limit 
                                                 
143 Original ranges based on center of China.  Image edited by author.  Original image produced for 
Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007.  
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the targets that can be held at risk.”144  This deduction may prove to be inaccurate, given 
the technological advancements that have led to an exceptionally quiet capable platform. 
O’Rourke does give some consideration to further out deployments: 
Assuming they made it out of port past lurking U.S. attack submarines, the 
Chinese missile submarines would have to sail through the narrow straight 
between South Korea and Japan into the Sea of Japan for its Julang-2 
missiles to be able to strike the Seattle area.145   
This line of reasoning, while sound just a few short years ago, does not account for the 
recent PLAN developments.  The Song class submarine, which surfaced near an 
American carrier, shows that Beijing may not “fear” American submarines.  While the 
trailing of a loud contact in a peacetime environment, with questionable SSN support 
may seem to have little implication in this case, it goes to show that their will be 
submarine captains with a large amount of experience against American assets.  An 
SSBN will never challenge a platform with known escorts, and will be traveling at far 
slower speeds, eliminating most of their sound signature.  If China chooses, the Type 094 
is quiet enough to venture southeast of Japan, to an area capable of targeting the 
continental United States.  Assuming Beijing will not make this decision would be a 
mistake by American analysts. 
Open water deployments will not happen until the JL-2 is fully tested and in 
service.  Some analysts believe that the JL-2 is plagued with problems and running 
behind schedule.  This belief seems to stem from an article written in 2004 for the 
Washington Times by Bill Gertz: 
U.S. intelligence officials said the Chinese suffered a setback in their JL-2 
missile program when a test flight of the JL-2 missile failed over the 
summer.  The JL-2 missile program was delayed by the test failure but is 
continuing to be developed, the officials said.146 
                                                 
144 O’Rourke, 120–121. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Bill Gertz, “China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine.”  
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While the test in the summer of 2004 may have been a failure, in no way should it be 
inferred that the JL-2 is not fully operational.  This failed test was the third in a series of 
four.147  Unlike the United States, it seems as if the 2nd Artillery only tests their ballistic 
missiles a small number of times.  For example, the JL-1 only had 3 test flights in 1985 
before coming operational in 1987.148  Overall, given the successful test in 2005, it is 
likely that the JL-2 is near ready for use. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Beijing has many deployment options available for the Type 094. These options 
primarily hinge on the numbers Beijing develops and deploys.  Overall, a class size of 
five to six ships will give Beijing a distinct advantage.  These advantages come in three 
different avenues. First, there are economic factors: the larger a run of ships in a class the 
lower the cost.  Second, given China’s adherence to a no-first-use doctrine, a larger run of 
ships will allow for a constant at sea presence, eliminating the perceived nuclear 
escalatory “steps” taken if China deploys the Type 094 in a crisis mode.  And finally, if 
China can maintain a larger Type 094 force, and employ multiple Type 094s they can 
double their survival rate against western SSNs.   
A class of 5-6 submarines, with the ability to conduct blue-water operations, is 
likely Beijing’s goal.  However, this force size is multiple years away.  Because of this, in 
the interim, a bastion strategy is currently the most likely near-term deployment option.  
China will encounter difficulty with bastion coordination, and incur a large expense due 
to the amount of forces necessary just to employ one SSBN.  Exercises, similar to the one 
conducted in November 2007, will increase Beijing’s chance for success.  However, 
multiple exercises will be needed to approach the level of proficiency necessary to 
protect an SSBN from aggressive SSNs (especially modern Virginia class boats).  All of 
the risk cannot be mitigated; the nature of a bastion strategy makes it dangerous for the 
                                                 
147 A planned launch was reported in September 2001, but this was cancelled. The first launch was 
made from the trials submarine in August 2002, with a reported range of 6,000 km. A second flight test was 
made in 2003, a third in August 2004, and a fourth in May 2005.  Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems – JL-2 
(CSS-NX-5).   
148 Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems – JL-2 (CSS-N-3). 
 59
PLAN.  Some mitigation is occurring; the increased number of exercises are indicative of 
added attention throughout the PLAN, which leads to doctrinal development and the 
testing of communications networks.  A bastion strategy, by design, gives up an SSBN’s 
general location and creates the perception of an escalatory nuclear step.  Beijing must 
carefully weigh these factors before employing the Type 094 in a crisis situation. 
China will have the ability to use both the Hainan and Yellow Sea as bastions.  
Given the current activity and the presence of submarine facilities, it is likely that both 
bases will be used.  If Beijing chooses to use the underground facilities at Hainan Island 
it will not be an easy task.  Both of these bastions, if the target is the United States, suffer 
from two problems.  First, most continental United States cities can only be reached by 
flying the JL-2 over Russia.  And second, employing the JL-2 to its maximum range may 
bring reliability issues.  Once properly trained and when greater numbers are available, 
the Type 094 will have the opportunity to deploy to the open ocean, making it much more 
versatile.  China may be willing to deploy the Type 094 through the narrow chokepoint 
into the Sea of Japan; however, this is a risky move.  A more likely open ocean location 
is southeast of Japan, through an avenue north of Taiwan.  This will provide maximum 
deterrence against the entire continental United States, with minimal danger to the 
platform.  However, this discussion of the Type 094 is based on the assumption that the 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TYPE 094 ON CHINA’S NO-FIRST-
USE POLICY 
Beijing will soon operate an advanced deterrence platform, with the ability to 
carry multiple warheads (from 12-48), outside their land boundaries.  This 
accomplishment may contradict China’s nuclear tradition: employing only a “small 
number of nuclear weapons entirely for self-defense.”149  The Type 094 submarine 
cannot be viewed as the simple evolution of weapon system technology over time. It is a 
significant addition to and diversification of China’s nuclear arsenal and thus warrants a 
close look at how nuclear platforms affect China’s nuclear policy.  The no-first-use 
policy—principally unchanged since 1964—will incorporate the Type 094 in the near 
future.  Reviewing the history, purpose, and limitations of Beijing’s nuclear policy will 
help better understand the policy changes required to incorporate the Type 094 
submarine. 
This review must answer a number of questions to offer adequate explanation of 
the Chinese change in policy.  First, why did Beijing initially develop nuclear weapons 
and the no-first-use policy?  Historically, the goal of the Chinese no-first-use policy has 
been to prevent a nuclear attack by promising a retaliatory attack against one of the 
aggressor’s cities.  The nuclear payload of the Type 094, with at least twelve nuclear 
weapons, appears to be leading to a policy-capability mismatch.  Second, is the no-first-
use policy outdated and unable to adequately provide for China’s defense?  (There are 
modern challenges to the validity of the no-first-use policy, primarily missile defense and 
precision weapons.) Third, under China’s implementation of the no-first-use policy, 
control of nuclear weapons is held at the highest level.  How much of this is the 
Communist Party willing to delegate in the time of a crisis?  Finally, is the no-first-use 
policy strategically limiting Beijing, not only in terms of the full use of the Type 094 
capabilities, but also making it impossible to adequately respond to an at sea casualty? 
 
                                                 
149 White Paper: China's National Defense in 2000. (People’s Republic of China, Information Office 
of the State Council in Chapter II: National Defense Policy, October 2000). 
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While the PLAN will face certain challenges incorporating the Type 094 into the 2nd 
Artillery’s doctrine, a publicly announced change to the no-first-use rhetoric is very 
unlikely. 
A. HISTORY 
China’s first successful test of a nuclear weapon occurred on October 16, 1964. 
Following the test Beijing released this statement. “The Chinese Government hereby 
solemnly declares that China will never at any time or under any circumstances be the 
first to use nuclear weapons.”150  This statement is straightforward, and provides the 
backbone for the no-first-use policy.  China’s nuclear strategy and nuclear forces were 
initially structured around this policy.  This initial policy has overarching themes that are 
applicable in a study of modern SSBNs.  First, the primary reason China developed 
nuclear weapons was “to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to 
eliminate nuclear weapons.”151  Second, Chinese no-first-use policy is a guiding principle 
- it is a vital part of Chinese nuclear tradition.  Third, a small force is all that is necessary, 
and this small size reflects the no-first-use policy.  Finally, this strategy has very little 
need for flexibility, as it only has one objective, i.e., the capability to destroy some cities 
after the initial nuclear attack to deter the aggressor. 
1. Chinese Nuclear Weapons Purpose 
In 1971, Chiao Kuan-hua, Vice-President of the Chinese People's Institute of 
Foreign Affairs, Vice-Minister of the Chinese Foreign Minister exclaimed to the UN 
General Assembly, “It is impossible to expect the other countries, which are subjected to 
the threat of the two nuclear powers, not to develop nuclear weapons for the purpose of 
self-defense.”152  Therefore, according to Beijing, China was forced to develop and 
                                                 
150 “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 16 October 1964, 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/nucsta64.htm (accessed 20 April 2009). 
151 Ibid. 
152 “Chiao Kuan-hua’s Speech at the UN General Assemble,” James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 24 November 1971, 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ch1171.htm (accessed 20 April 20). 
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deploy nuclear weapons.  If the world powers had followed China’s advice initially, all 
nuclear weapons would have been destroyed and there would have been no need for the 
Chinese atomic test in 1964.153  Beijing’s acquisition of nuclear weapons was purported 
to ultimately achieve this purpose. According to Chiao, China needed to “[break] the 
superpowers' nuclear monopoly and finally [eliminate] nuclear weapons.”154  China had 
good reason to feel this way, given the recent threats by the United States to use nuclear 
weapons if Beijing moved against Taiwan.  The Eisenhower administration overtly 
asserted that they “considered atomic weapons interchangeable with the conventional 
weapons in the American arsenal.”155  In 1955, China had no answer to Eisenhower’s 
threat.  Therefore initially, Chinese weapons were meant to break a monopoly, to ensure 
that they could provide for their own defense.  But ultimately Beijing hopes that they can 
eventually destroy all of their nuclear weapons when the need for them is no longer 
present.  By providing a minimal amount of deterrence, China is able to focus on pushing 
for the incorporation of the no-first-use and eventually nuclear weapon elimination policy 
by other nuclear powers. 
Why is China pushing this agenda?  Chinese rhetoric is bent on convincing the 
world that Beijing’s nuclear policy is designed to encourage a “nuclear-free” world.  
However, the no-first-use policy is partially a result of necessity, not simply good 
intentions.  China lacks the nuclear arsenal to win a nuclear fight with either Russia or the 
United States.  If they were to initiate a nuclear attack against either of these powers they 
would be quickly overwhelmed.  As discussed in Chapter Two, there was a good chance 
that if China even indicated they were thinking of launching a weapon, many of their 
nuclear weapons would be destroyed, severely limiting their long-range destructive 
potential.  China’s no-first-use policy promises that one city would be destroyed in 
                                                 
153 As early as July 31, 1963, the Chinese Government issued a statement advocating the complete, 
thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapon. “Chiao Kuan-hua’s Speech at 
the UN General Assemble.” 
154 Ibid. 
155 Gordon H. Chang summarizing the Dulles memorandum, meeting with Eisenhower, March 6, 
1995 (Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda, Box 3, Meetings with the President 1955).  Gordon H. 
Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,” International Security, 
vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), 106.  
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retaliation.  This policy was initially designed under resource constraints not anti-nuclear 
sentiment; Beijing only possessed nuclear forces with the ability to retaliate against one, 
maybe two cities.  In addition, a minimalist strategy makes China appear to seek a 
nuclear weapon free world.   Russian and American nuclear weapons elimination, 
supporting this appearance, greatly benefits a nuclear-weak China. If the world disarmed, 
China’s relative power would increase.  China, a state with relatively few nuclear 
weapons, becomes more powerful with every nuclear weapon Moscow and Washington 
dismantles and destroys.  In 1998 Ambassador Qian Jiadong, permanent representative of 
the People’s Republic of China to the UN Office at Geneva, eloquently stated why China 
should not disarm:  
The lesser nuclear weapon states, Britain, France and China, naturally 
have to join in the reduction process as well, but apparently it would be 
unrealistic to require them to do so right now, considering the great 
disproportion between the sizes of their arsenals and those of the US and 
Russia.156 
While the claim by Ambassador Qian sounds reasonable, it is still important to note that 
China is willing to work to decrease this disproportion, either by encouraging the 
elimination of Washington and Moscow’s arsenals, or building more weapons of their 
own.  This imbalance in nuclear weapons among China, Russia, and America, is slowly 
going down.  However, the difference in nuclear weapon stockpiles is large.  Until this 
changes significantly, Beijing’s nuclear weapons program will continue to serve 
primarily defensive needs.  The no-first-use policy is at the core of this defense.  With a 
historically limited arsenal, China can only promise reactive defense. 
2. Guiding Principle or Evolving Doctrine 
With the incorporation of a viable SSBN, China’s nuclear arsenal will increase in 
effectiveness.  This capability and policy mismatch will require Beijing to decide whether 
or not to pursue a change to their no-first-use policy.  This will not be a simple change to 
                                                 
156 Ambassador Qian Jiadong, “Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: China’s Policy,” Letter available at the 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 7 November 
1998, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/qjd1198.htm (accessed 20 April 2009). 
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strategy, and, if it occurs at all, it will likely never occur publicly.  The importance of the 
no-first-use policy is likely greater than any military strategy in China.  Pan Zhenqiang, a 
retired Major General in the PLA Army and currently a professor at the Institute of 
Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in China, argues one reason why the 
no-first-use policy is culturally important, “that change of the nuclear policy will tarnish 
its image in the non-nuclear weapon states, which China has [been] so consistently proud 
of.”157  The government in Beijing realizes the importance of this to Chinese self-
perception, and it would be detrimental for them to change it. James Mulvenon, deputy 
director, advanced analysis at DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, and 
David Finkelstein, deputy director of “Project Asia” at CNA Corporation’s Center for 
Strategic Studies advance Maj. Gen Pan’s position: 
The importance of China’s NFU pledge lies in its centrality to Chinese 
doctrine.  Since 1964, NFU has become one of centerpieces of Chinese 
nuclear doctrine; for Chinese strategists, NFU is not simply a policy 
statement (as it was for the Soviet Union during the Cold War) but rather 
is considered a guiding principle (zhidao yuanze) of nuclear doctrine. The 
extent to which Western analysts see NFU as a policy statement and the 
Chinese think of it as a guiding principle serves as a source of confusion 
and friction in understanding the current composition and future evolution 
of Chinese nuclear doctrine.158 
If the no-first-use is a guiding principle and not a policy statement, change seems even 
more unlikely.  However, guiding principles can change; they just may change privately 
at the highest level.  If a change occurs there should be subtle, but still observable, 
changes in doctrine, force planning and training.  Bates Gill, Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes 
explain this idea in terms of the nature of the no-first-use policy, its implications of 
limiting arsenal, difficulty in determining policy evolutions, and the opportunity for 
policy changes inherent in new weapons system: 
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First, [a no-first-use] pledge is highly symbolic—it is not verifiable and 
any violation of the pledge would not be detected until it is too late. 
Second, as a practical matter, we need to recognize that the NFU pledge is 
probably less an altruistic principle, and more a simple reflection of the 
traditional operational constraints imposed on Chinese doctrine by the 
country’s qualitatively and quantitatively limited arsenal: China maintains 
an NFU pledge because it fits with the realities of nuclear weapons 
inventory. As its force structure changes, so too might its NFU 
principle.159 
In the past forty years, no force structure change has been so drastic as the 
incorporation of ballistic missile submarines.  Historically, the 2nd Artillery has never 
possessed the technology or the ability to exchange nuclear blows with a superpower.  
The best-case scenario was a one-time, limited retaliatory strike.  The no-first-use policy 
fits this limitation well, as it allows Beijing to utilize their nuclear forces effectively and 
reap the added public relations benefits.  However the new capabilities inherent in the 
SSBN will change that basic structure. 
3. Force Size Requirements 
The no-first-use policy brings additional substantive benefits to Beijing.  Because 
of its limited nature, it only requires a small force made up of relatively archaic nuclear 
technology.  Yoshihara and Holmes explain how these benefits are related to the policy. 
“Such nuclear minimalism has exerted significant influence on China’s nuclear posture, 
suppressing the size and readiness of the force structure.”160  Size and technological 
advancements can be evaluated by comparison.  Examining the reason behind 
Washington’s extremely large nuclear arsenal highlights the benefits of Beijing's policy.  
For the United States to employ overwhelming nuclear force against a country (or 
multiple countries) they must maintain a much larger weapon arsenal.  A nuclear triad, 
with air, land, and sea delivery platforms, becomes necessary to increase the amount of 
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destruction enacted upon the enemy and to engage in competition at different levels of 
the nuclear ladder of escalation.  General Pan explains how China is different: 
In accordance with the no-first-use doctrine, China didn’t find it essential 
to develop a large nuclear arsenal in number. The idea was as long as you 
are able to give a devastating counter-attack against one or two U.S. big 
cities, the scenario was enough to make the attacker who had the intention 
of preemptive nuclear strike pause, and hopefully drop the plan.161 
Ten surviving weapons, with a 50% accuracy rate, are likely to accomplish a devastating 
attack on an American city.  Given the United States domestic reaction following 
September 11, 2001, any chance of a nuclear response will likely drive policy makers 
toward non-nuclear solutions in a crisis.  The unlikelihood of nuclear war, combined with 
the monetary benefits of fielding hundreds of weapons vs. thousands, is very 
advantageous for China. 
4. Strategy Flexibility 
Nuclear weapons, when intended for first use, are designed to be smart, stealthy, 
and advanced: surprise is the key to their success.  However, overly complex weapons do 
not work well with a no-first-use policy.  The weapons this policy requires are intended 
for harsh, post-nuclear attack conditions.  They need to be useable, hardened, and 
simplistic.  Complex systems have a high chance of failure and are simply “overkill.”  
General Pan explains:  
China didn’t find it essential either to seek the qualitative improvement of 
its nuclear force such as acquiring the capability of striking at the military 
targets, with much greater precision guidance, or fitting more nuclear 
warheads on a single missile (MIRVed).162 
The no-first-use policy requires no strategic flexibility. It simply requires one response--
reply to an aggressive nuclear attack with nuclear weapons against a local (city) with a 
large population.  First use weapons are designed with a distinct purpose, often to knock 
out enemy nuclear launch capabilities.  To ensure a high rate of success, these weapons 




are designed to employ precision strike, multiple warheads, and dummy warheads.  Large 
coordinated attacks are required to limit any response.   On the contrary, no-first-use 
weapons only need to defeat any “missile defense” employed by a country.  Targeting 
can be general and technology can be minimal.   A complex undersea platform, likely 
(although possibly not at this time) to employ multiple warheads is not necessary to meet 
this goal.   
B. RECENT POLICY CHALLENGES 
The world has changed around China’s no-first-use policy.  This policy was 
technologically sound into the late 1990s.  However, the advent of two weapons 
advancements in particular - precision weapons and missile defense - make this policy 
outdated and unable to provide for adequate Chinese protection.  From a political point of 
view, the no-first-use policy is a source of pride and positive press for the Communist 
Party.  General Pan explains the problem from a different angle, “For one thing, from an 
operational point of view, China’s no-first-use pledge seems to have greatly bound its 
hands to maintain flexibility in seeking the optimum options.”163  As it stands now, no 
options are available to Beijing until it is able to engage and overcome 1) precision 
weapons and 2) missile defense.   
Precision weapons may one day make nuclear weapons obsolete.  The ability to 
launch a precision weapon against a moving target may provide enough deterrence to 
make the collateral damage inherent to nuclear weapons outweigh the benefits. David 
Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Director, China 
Policy Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, explains how precision weapons 
are changing the way Beijing is preparing for future conflict: 
The opening days of the Gulf War convinced PLA analysts that they were 
witnessing a revolution in military affairs…the allied naval armada sat 
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defenses, launching wave after wave of air strikes and cruise missile 
attacks.  The surgical bombing substantially degraded Iraqi air 
defenses.164 
Precision weapon attacks against China’s nuclear forces have to be a cause of great 
concern for Beijing.  Currently, mobile nuclear missiles may still have an advantage over 
precision strikes, maintaining the ability for a quick launch after a short setup. However, 
as the technology behind western precision missile continues to evolve and the efficiency 
in missile employment rises, mobile missiles will become more vulnerable.165  Some 
analysts, including Shen Dingli, deputy director and professor, Center of American 
Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, question the validity of the no-first-use 
deterrence policy when faced with precision weapons. 
If China’s conventional forces are devastated, and if Taiwan takes the 
opportunity to declare de jure independence, it is inconceivable that China 
would allow its nuclear weapons to be destroyed by a precision attack with 
conventional munitions, rather than use them as true means of 
deterrence.166 
Regardless of Beijing’s actual response when they are nearly defeated or faced with a 
step toward Taiwan independence, China must consider the effect precision weapons will 
have on their ability to launch nuclear counterattacks.  This launch ability is a step 
progress that can be attacked at separate critical junctions. Precision weapons are able to 
target nuclear weapon systems, communications grids, as well as decision makers.  These 
weapons may make even a well-hidden SSBN useless, leaving them without launch 
command and control.  Regardless, as it now stands, if conventional precision attacks are 
made against China’s nuclear weapons and their control, China, cannot respond with 
nuclear weapons and remain true to a literal reading of the no-first-use policy. 
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Missile defense is another recent western advancement that threatens the no-first-
use policy credibility.  While precision weapons threaten nuclear weapons prior to their 
launch, missile defense attacks nuclear weapons after launch.  Although they loudly 
oppose it, Beijing has no tactical answers for missile defense.167  As discussed in 
Chapters I and II, missile defense systems are driving China to acquire the Type 094.  
General Pan explains this phenomenon in larger terms: 
Given the deployment of missile defense systems, China should perhaps 
realize that the present minimum nuclear arsenal is inadequate to meeting 
the new challenges, and therefore should greatly expand its nuclear force 
to the extent that it can be actually used in different scenarios.168   
Beijing can meet the challenges posed by missile defense system in two ways.  They can 
expand their nuclear forces (the development of the Type 094 fits this argument), and 
they can change their no-first-use policy to better utilize their existing nuclear forces.  
With a missile defense force in use, if China has any nuclear weapons in operation after 
initial precision attacks, the response force will likely be destroyed.169   
Overall, the no-first-use policy does not match the threats posed to China’s 2nd 
Artillery.  China’s nuclear forces lack the ability to overcome precision weapons or 
missile defense.  Upgrading to an undersea platform may revive the no-first-use policies 
credibility; however, this argument is limited.  Precision weapons, targeting the Chinese 
communication infrastructure, may prevent the Type 094 from receiving launch 
commands, negating its deterrence.170  This has led many to believe that China may 
update their no-first-use policy.  According to Mulvenon and Finklestein, “Following the 
release of the 2000 National Defense White Paper, some Chinese privately indicated that 
during the drafting process there were internal discussions about whether to 
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conditionalize China’s NFU commitment.”171  A published change to the no-first-use is 
not likely to occur anytime in the near future.  However, behind closed doors, there must 
be a heated discussion occurring on how China can change their policies to match current 
technology. 
C. INCORPORATION OF SSBNS AND LAUNCH POLICY 
The Type 094 is a flexible platform able to adjust (if desired) to a change in the 
no-first-use policy.  This flexibility comes from a ballistic missile submarine’s inherent 
nature, which combines stealth and mobility, negates many of the benefits associated 
with precision weapons and missile defense.  When incorporated, the Type 094 will 
allow Beijing to back up the no-first-use policy with modern technology, making it a 
viable policy for the foreseeable future.  The incorporation of ballistic missile submarine 
patrols and the no-first-use policy comes with challenges that China must overcome.   
These issues were never actually addressed with the Type 092, as it never deployed on a 
deterrent patrol, although it was likely planned for and discussed.  Ultimately, Beijing 
must change traditional attitudes before incorporating SSBNs into the no-first-use policy.  
First, China must reverse (although likely without explanation) its long-standing 
opposition to countries deploying ballistic missile submarines beyond their borders.  
Second, China must make critical control issue decisions, specifically how will nuclear 
weapon coordination occur in a hostile, open, at sea environment in the midst of nuclear 
war. 
Beijing has a history of opposition to countries deploying ballistic missile 
submarines.  This opposition can be found in Chinese government statements starting in 
the early 1960s.    
U.S. submarines carrying Polaris missiles with nuclear warheads are 
prowling the Taiwan Straits, the Bac Bo Gulf (Tonkin Gulf), the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic 
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Ocean, everywhere threatening peace-loving countries and all the peoples 
who are fighting against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.172 
It is understandable that in the early 1960s militarily weak China felt threatened by 
United States power projection capability.  Beijing publicly opposed ballistic missile 
submarines, not only for their own protection, but also for the region as well. “In 
stationing nuclear submarines in Japan, the United States is posing a direct threat to the 
Japanese people, the Chinese people, and the peoples of all other Asian countries.”173  
Technology and capability have certainly reversed these feelings.  How is the 
deployment of a Type 094 less threatening than the Polaris submarines of the 1960s?   
One argument China may pose to prove the non-threatening nature of their 
ballistic missile forces is that they do not intend to deploy the Type 094 beyond their 
territorial waters.  The United States, due to the limited range of the Polaris ballistic 
missile, was forced to operate close to Soviet Union in order to provide adequate 
deterrence.  Beijing may argue that they intend to operate the Type 094 in bastions within 
their territorial waters.  This argument is in line with Beijing’s stance that they “never 
[deploy] any nuclear weapons beyond [their] borders.”174  However, as discussed in 
Chapter III, this type of deployment falls short of China’s deterrence needs.  In the 1960s 
Washington would have certainly preferred to keep the Polaris missile submarines close 
to the continental United States, but they could not.  In order to be viable, the submarine 
with a missile of limited range had to be close to its target.  The same is true for the Type 
094. In order to be a viable deterrent, able to threaten the continental United States, it will 
have to deploy outside of China’s territorial waters.  These extended deployments, 
necessary until Beijing improves the range of their ballistic missiles, would be at odds 
with the CPC’s published policy:  
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All nuclear weapon states which have deployed nuclear weapons outside 
their borders withdraw all these weapons home … China has not deployed 
and will not deploy any nuclear weapons outside its border. China 
considers this to be a matter of principle.175 
China’s “principles” will have to be adjusted to match their capabilities and deterrence 
needs.  It is likely that this will occur without statement from Beijing.  This is an easy 
change; certainly one Beijing is ready to make.   
The second change is not so easy.  In order to ensure retaliatory launches from the 
Type 094, Beijing must adjust the 2nd artillery’s launch control norms.  Shambaugh 
discusses launch control norms and uncertainties as they relate to land-based weapons.  
It is not certain exactly how the communication to launch missiles is 
conveyed via the [General Staff Department] GSD, but it is believed that 
there are also separate and secure communication lines from the [Central 
Military Commission] CMC to Second Artillery Headquarters and thence 
to all launch brigades.  It is also understood that a launch brigade must 
receive separate communications from the CMC and GSD before a launch 
is authorized.176 
Maintaining multiple lines of communication, in an at sea environment, is difficult in 
calm seas and nearly impossible in poor weather situations.  If both the CMC and GSD 
are required to issue separate transmissions, there is a possibility that both orders will not 
be received.  Because of this, Beijing has two options to ensure weapons release in a 
crisis: either improve their submarine communication ability to a level of redundancy 
offering near perfect communications, or delegate nuclear release to the unit level.  
The Royal Navy, relying solely on SSBNs for nuclear deterrence, places great 
emphasis on submarine communications.  “Ballistic missile submarines must at all times 
have a robust and reliable link with their chain of command on the mainland…in order to 
authorize the use of nuclear weapons and keep them under firm political control.”177  
Beijing has a number of options available for communicating with their submarines, as 
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shown in Figure 8.  Given the ASW environment in which the Type 094 will operate, 
surfacing or even operating at periscope depth may be too risky.  ELF (extremely low 
frequencies) and VLF (very low frequencies) communications are the safest options 
available to Beijing.  However, both options have their own inherent challenges that 
PLAN forces must overcome. 
 
Figure 8.   Submarine Communication Options178 Source: GlobalSecurity.org 
Very Low Frequency communications have a long history of use for Chinese 
submarines.  According to John Lewis and Xue Litai, Mao himself took interest in the 
construction of some high power stations.179  VLF communications are robust, requiring 
tall (500ft+) towers for transmission.  This communication method has two 
insurmountable problems.  As seen in Figure 9, the towers are extremely large, making 
them vulnerable to attack from precision weapons.  And more importantly, VLF 
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journal Air Power, argues that Beijing is, “apparently anxious about the ability of 
advanced navies to home in on long transmission bursts.”180  These two issues with VLF 
communications may make their effectiveness in a crisis questionable.   
 
 
Figure 9.   VLF Towers at Greenbury Point in Annapolis, MD181 
Switching to Extremely low frequency communications mitigates the problems 
that plague VLF communications.  As seen in figure 10, ELF transmission does not 
require large towers, and submarines can stay hidden and deeply submerged, and retain 
conductivity.  ELF transmissions have an extreme range and travel easily through air, 
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water, or land.  They will be the preferred method of transmitting data and launch 
commands to the Type 094 when at sea.  Polk explains this advantage, but questions 
China’s ability to utilize these systems.   
Extremely low frequency (ELF) communications have the advantage that 
messages can be received at depths of two to three hundred metres,  
maximising submarine stealth and survivability.  There are major 
problems with ELF in practice, however, and it is not clear that China has 
mastered that technology.182 
Polk made this claim in late 2005, and it is likely that Beijing has been increasing their 
ELF capabilities.  Even with this increase, it will still be difficult for China to maintain 
constant two-way communications with ELF or VLF in high sea states.  A submarine 
may be able to retrieve information, but not send back acknowledgement.  Given this, 
will the leadership in Beijing be willing to delegate a level of control to submarine 
commanders and political officers? 
 
Figure 10.   ELF Communications183 Source: www.vlf.it 
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No foreseeable submarine communication method will ever be 100% reliable.  
Because of this, most countries deploying submarines allow the onboard leadership 
decision-making ability, trusting their judgment and training.  There are conflicting 
opinions about whether Beijing is willing to do this.  According to James Mulvenon and 
David Finkelstein’s interpretation of the Zhanyixue, the science of campaigns, launch 
authority does not have to always rest with Beijing. 
The retaliatory strike is “usually” (tongchang; 通常) carried out under the 
direction of the supreme command, perhaps suggesting that the authority 
to launch a retaliatory strike could be delegated to lower levels under 
certain unspecified circumstances.184 
There may be a limited amount of authority Beijing is willing to grant to lower 
levels.  It is difficult to speculate how the relationship between the CMC, GMC, 
Commanding Officer, and Political Officer will play out.  Yoshihara and Holmes explain 
that 100% launch control may be out of their hands: 
Foremost in the thinking of any political leadership is command and 
control of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. It is unclear whether Beijing would 
be willing to delegate operational control of a nuclear-armed submarine to 
a tactical commander.  Like Moscow during the Cold War, Beijing may 
want to assert closer supervision. Practical considerations such as 
technical feasibility and steep financial costs, moreover, could impose 
burdens that China may be unwilling to carry.185 
A technical and political balance for control will have to be hashed out between Beijing 
and the PLAN.  The key to this relationship will be situational awareness.  To be 
successful, Beijing must keep their submarines current on world and regional events that 
affect leadership decision making.  If the submarine has limited knowledge of the outside 
world, the crew may doubt, or at the very least, be surprised and fumble through launch 
procedures in an environment where time may not be on Beijing’s side.  If a country, 
such as the United States, launches nuclear weapons against China, it is unthinkable to 
believe that they will not send their SSNs on hunt and kill missions, bringing the 
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survivability of the Type 094 into question.  Beijing may be willing to wait a number of 
days before launching a retaliatory strike … but they may lack a weapon system at that 
point.186 
China’s incorporation of the Type 094 at peace, within the limitations of no-first-
use policy, will be vital to understanding how Beijing will control their SSBNs in war. It 
will be easy for China to reverse their opposition to countries deploying SSBNs, a 
political argument based more on capabilities than convictions.  Communication 
efficiency, in a hostile environment, will dictate how much control Beijing must give to 
the submarine.  This flow of information will be the difference between an effective 
deterrent and a vulnerable unreliable weapon. 
D. SUBMARINE CASUALTIES 
The flow of information on a submarine is vital for deterrence operations.  
However, situational reports and launch orders only make up a portion of the essential 
information.  The reverse flow of information, from the submarine to Beijing, will limit 
the risk of escalation following problems or mishaps.  A constant “reverse” flow of 
information, good or bad, alerts Beijing that ultimately the patrolling Type 094 is not lost.  
This is vitally important, because while at sea the Type 094 will face casualties.  The 
recent collision involving French and British SSBNs is a good illustration of this. Even 
highly trained navies, with years of SSBN operating experience, suffer at-sea mishaps.187  
In the event of a serious casualty, it is likely that at some point Beijing will lose contact 
with the submarine.  How the CCP reacts to the unknown will be shaped by the no-first-
use policy.  Under the no-first-use policy, the CCP cannot retaliate (nuclear) after the loss 
of an SSBN, even if it believes that loss was due to enemy attack.188 
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For the sake of simplification, submarine crises at sea can be broken up into two 
categories; equipment failures and personnel mistakes or encounters with aggressive 
enemy submarines (which in turn cause equipment failures and personnel mistakes).  
Usually, while on patrol, the likelihood that an SSBN will encounter an opposing 
submarine is considerably less than attack submarines, as their mission dictates a remote 
deployment area.  In addition, for many countries, trailing enemy SSBNs is a risky 
proposition; aggressive submarine hunting may trigger nuclear war if a country feels their 
deterrent is threatened.  China’s nuclear policy may cause the Type 094 to be treated 
differently.  If western planners believe in the validity of the no-first-use policy, they will 
aggressively track and engage the Type 094, without fear of nuclear retaliation.  This 
increases the likelihood of at sea encounters to a level similar or above that of an attack 
submarine. This is a risky proposition given the Type 094’s weapons load.  An accident, 
credited to a western submarine, could conceivable cause public outcry vastly more 
enraged than the one seen after the 1999 bombing of the embassy in Belgrade.  
According to Susan Shirk, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during the 
Clinton Administration in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the time of the 
bombing. 
When the Belgrade bombing occurred, [the Chinese leaders] believed that 
it was quite likely that the students would be enraged at the Chinese 
government itself for being so weak as to allow in some sense the 
Americans to attack the embassy.189 
The public, enraged over perceived weakness in the face of America or other 
competitor, will command the Communist Party's full attention, taking it away from the 
crisis situation.  The CCP has two options to limit a public response to the loss of an 
SSBN. First, they must ensure their crews are highly trained in damage control, able to 
safely save the ship in any matter of crisis.  And second, the Communist Party cannot 
allow blame to be blindly placed on Washington if a crisis does occur. 
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Damage control, in the face of flooding, fire, loss of control, and casualties, will 
mean the difference between life and death for submarines.  Why can something as 
simple as clothes drier fires cause grave concern?  Time.  On land or surface, 
catastrophes, such as fires or rudder issues, can be dealt with in minutes.  Teams have 
time to don equipment and air spaces as necessary to ensure safety.  This is not the case 
for submarines; catastrophes must be dealt with immediately, in seconds instead of 
minutes.  For example, a small fire, in the enclosed space of a submarine, could cause 
asphyxiation for the entire crew in a matter of minutes, causing the loss of the entire 
submarine (or sea-based nuclear deterrent in the case of the Type 094).    
For an SSBN, casualties can be far worse.  To be an effective deterrent the Type 
094 must stay hidden; they will not have the luxury of surfacing when on patrol.  A study 
of submarine casualties, conducted in 1986 still holds true for today: 
Plane failures and flooding are the most critical of the casualties to be 
trained… emphasize the need for adjustment of recovery action to 
operational requirements, such as the tactical situation and concealment by 
noiseless submerged running for as long as possible.190 
Therefore, not only will the Type 094 have to deal with casualties effectively in a very 
short time period, they will also have to do so without surfacing or alerting enemy 
submarines to their location.  Given these high goals, PLAN training for submarine 
accident control is not to the level required for reliable SSBN operations.  This point of 
view is based the accident on the Ming class (hull number 361) attack submarine that 
killed all personnel on board.191  In articles about this tragedy, the BBC stated, “China’s 
navy has also reportedly experienced operating problems because of inadequate crew 
training.”192  If the crew died of asphyxiation, their deaths were preventable and caused 
by equipment or crew failure.  A catastrophe on a Type 094 will be more severe, given 
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the nature of their weapons and likelihood that their procedures would keep them 
submerged during a casualty.  How Beijing responds to an accident or the loss of the 
Type 094, will greatly effect how the population responds to the CCP. 
As discussed, because of the reaction limitation imposed by the no-first-use policy 
on the Type 094, it will encounter enemy attack submarines.  If there is a catastrophe on 
board the Type 094, the Communist Party may be quick to blame American SSNs.  This 
will cause the Communist Party to face an uneasy population, not keen on accepting 
American apologies for military actions.  The Russian government was quick to place 
blame following the 2000 loss of the Kursk submarine.   
Being close to panic under such pressure, the naval authorities built their 
main line of defense on the hypotheses of a collision with a U.S. or British 
submarine. Scant evidence was presented to support this hypothesis, but 
retired admirals (Eduard Baltin and Valery Aleksin were the most 
outspoken) immediately added all sorts of expert analysis.193 
Even if an accident is clearly caused by an American submarine, the CCP must be careful 
in their response.  The no-first-use policy dictates that Beijing cannot react with nuclear 
weapons; however, the people will demand retribution for the loss of their submarine.  If 
Beijing reacts with hypothesis or misinformation, they risk revolution if they do not 
threaten the United States with retaliation.  Ultimately, the no-first-use policy increases 
the risk for an at-sea SSBN.  With no “nuclear policy response protection,” promising 
nuclear war if an SSBN is attacked, the Type 094 will operate in a hostile environment.  
This environment might have never existed if the attacking submarine felt that their 
actions might cause nuclear war.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Overall, China’s adherence to the no-first-use policy will sharply limit the tactical 
options and increase the risk to the Type 094.  Over time, the no-first-use policy has been 
greatly affected by circumstances inside and outside China.  Born out of equipment 
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limitations in the 1960s, China soon realized the diplomatic and economic advantages of 
employing a small defensive nuclear force.  These advantages came at a high price for 
Beijing, as they limited China’s nuclear acquisitions to a point where they were unable to 
account for missile defense and precision weapons.  The Type 094, when on patrol, will 
give the no-first-use policy the needed flexibility to provide for China’s nuclear deterrent 
in the near future.  However, the PLAN may not be ready for SSBN operations under this 
policy.  According to a DoD assessment, ‘the PLA has only a limited capacity to 
communicate with submarines at sea and the PLA Navy has no experience in managing 
an SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols.”194  In addition, the Type 094 will 
encounter a high level of enemy SSNs, unfettered by nuclear responsibilities.  Crisis 
situations will arise, and Beijing must have answers.  The limitations and risks of 
employing the no-first-use policy with SSBNs on patrol may outweigh the diplomatic 
benefits.  This may warrant a policy change in the near future. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
When the Type 094 ballistic missile submarine makes its first patrol, many 
strategic factors, key to United States foreign policy, will change.  These factors include: 
the beginning of a balance shift, between Russia and China, in the underwater nuclear 
weapons domain, the impact of China reaching a level of strategic parity with the U.S., 
specifically guaranteed second strike capability, and the loss of policy options, due to 
invisible nuclear escalatory ability.  A discussion of these factors, while the conclusion of 
this thesis, is the starting point for a policy debate that must occur prior to the first Type 
094 deterrent patrol. 
To accomplish this discussion this chapter will be structured in the following 
fashion.  First, a discussion of the balance of nuclear power, specifically between Russia, 
the United States, and China must occur.  This may seem counterintuitive at first glance 
given the large disparity between Russian and Chinese nuclear force size, however due 
primarily to each state’s level of SSBN readiness and repair; a declining leg of Russian 
nuclear triad is becoming China’s strength.  How will this overtaking of Russian 
deployed ballistic missile submarines by China affect the United States Navy?  Second, a 
level of nuclear parity is being reached between Washington and Beijing, similar to when 
Russia released the Yankee class.  How will this affect the United States ability to control 
escalation in a crisis?  Implications for overall Washington procurement and specifically 
for the Taiwan issue must be addressed.  And finally, this chapter will include a summary 
of the entire thesis wrapping up the discussion on the Type 094. 
A. BALANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER 
Without question for the foreseeable future, the United States and Russia will 
hold the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons. Both countries are currently retiring and 
mothballing legacy nuclear systems, but even with this reduction their relative sizes are 
nowhere near their closest competitors. One competitor, China, is an important example.  
While China has spent an incredible amount increasing the number and quality of their 
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nuclear weapons, it will remain far behind both the U.S. and Russia in terms of arsenal 
size.  Dr. Subhash Kapila, a consultant for Strategic Affairs with the South Asia Analysis 
Group, explains how Russia’s arsenal relates to China: 
Russia’s existing strategic nuclear weapons arsenal outnumbers the United 
States whereas China’s nuclear arsenal at about 400 warheads is a remote 
comparison … Russia’s existing power projection capabilities extend far 
beyond its immediate neighbourhood, in all dimensions – land, sea and air.  
China’s power projection is limited to her periphery and limited to ground 
forces dimensions only.195 
This style of analysis highlights the problem of looking at nuclear weapons simply in 
terms of numbers.  However, there are two other issues that must be addressed. First, 
Russia may have a large number of weapons, but their readiness, at this time, is very 
poor. It is unlikely they could successfully launch the majority of their nuclear weapons 
in short order. Secondly, there is a point where numbers no longer matter; the argument 
that a country can “destroy the world X number of times over,” holds little importance 
during strategic planning.  Once China has the ability to threaten the majority of U.S. or 
Russian cities, with survivable weapons, they will have equaled the “tangible” destructive 
power of the other superpowers.196  With this trend in mind, Pacific Forum CSIS believes 
there is need for new research: 
There is increasingly a need to link – both conceptually and structurally – 
the trajectories of the U.S.-Russian nuclear build-down and of China’s 
nuclear modernization. Over time, the trajectories will move closer 
together. This requires exploration of the consequences of this 
convergence.197 
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To highlight this fact in terms of the Type 094 SSBN, the tangible destructive 
overtaking will occur when Russia can no longer threaten the United States with an 
underwater-deployed weapon, with the same consistency as China.  Consistency, the 
promise of nuclear deterrence, is the key to this argument, and it is where the Type 094 
fits in.  The quality and quantity of Russian SSBN deployments have decreased in recent 
years.  From 1983 to 2006 the number of deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) decreased from over 100 to less than 10 (Figure 11). If this trend continues, 
with only two or three deployed submarines, China will be on par with Russian SLBM 
numbers at sea in the medium term.198   
 
Figure 11.   Russian Submarine Patrols 1981-2006199 Source: www.nukestrat.com 
There are strategic consequences for Beijing that result from their relative 
increase in nuclear standing verses Moscow.  Upon first look, many of these future 
consequences are negative, and will be the direct result of United States naval force 
redeployment.  For example, there is currently a 53% - 47 % U.S. SSN force split 
between the Pacifica and Atlantic Oceans.  It is likely that this number will change as 
                                                 
198 This number pales in comparison to the amount of SLBMs the United States Navy maintains at 
sea. 
199 Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian Submarine Patrols 1981-2006,” Federation of American Scientists, 
© April 2007; PDF, http://www.nukestrat.com/russia/patrol.pdf (accessed 7 May 2009). 
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new strategic threat forces are deployed.200  This force redistribution, to include ASW 
assets, will place an increased amount of pressure on the PLAN navy, making 
deployments more costly and potentially dangerous.  In addition, United States Navy 
force redistribution will be a “hot” topic in Washington decision-making circles. This 
will likely highlight the need for an increase in ASW spending and result in a larger, 
more proficient western ASW force.  In the case of the Type 094, the negative 
consequences of deployment will bring about strategic benefits for China.   
The redistribution of U.S. Navy ASW forces toward China as a result of the Type 
094 will result in improved Chinese SSN and SSBN crews.  Competition, and the 
underwater “cat and mouse” games it encourages, greatly enhances crew training and 
proficiency.  China’s deterrence ability will greatly benefit from their increase in 
submarine activity throughout the region and the United States failure to address stagnant 
ASW capabilities.  It is a widely accepted fact that American ASW has degraded as a 
result of decreased Russian activity following the end of the Cold War. The reason for 
this is simple: ASW capabilities can only be perfected against competing unpredictable 
submarines.  How quickly can U.S. ASW recover to stem the advancements from 
Beijing?  For the first time Chinese submarines (including the Type 094) will be 
operating in an environment with direct competition, honing their skills against the most 
proficient submarine force in the world.  Although they will likely experience “growing 
pains,” this will lead to a generation of Chinese submarine crews extremely proficient at 
their craft.  This experience will be especially valuable for the “boomer” sailors, as they 
learn to hide their boats with silent precision. 
These two benefits, the relative increase in the strategic importance of the PLAN 
in Asia and the experience and competence of the Type 094 crews, is something 
Washington must account for.  This accounting must also include an offset of 
 
                                                 
200 There are 31 SSNs and 8 SSBNs in the Pacific Command compared to 27 SSNs and 8 SSBNs in 
the Pacific.  “COMSUBPAC Submarines,” United States Navy, Commander: Submarine Force U.S. Pacific 
Fleet, http://www.csp.navy.mil/content/comsubpac_subsquadrons.shtml (accessed 8 June 2009); “Atlantic 
Submarine Force Organization,” United States Navy, Commander: Submarine Force, 
http://www.sublant.navy.mil/SubsSquadrons.htm (accessed 8 June 2009). 
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Washington’s losses in strategic options.  United States planners have not encountered a 
loss of this magnitude since the deployment of the first Yankee class SSBN by the Soviet 
Union in the 1960s. 
B. ESCALATION CONTROL OPTIONS 
In 1969, significant changes were made in terms of Soviet SSBN capability.  The 
introduction of the Yankee class submarine, the first Soviet SSBN with “firepower 
comparable to that of their U.S. counterparts,”201 greatly affected Washington planning.  
The successful deployment of the Type 094 will likely have a similar effect.  The most 
crucial impact on the United States in the late 1960s was the decreased decision time 
available to the President and top military officials.  A secondary issue was the removal 
of a “disarming first strike” option against Soviet nuclear forces.  Both of these effects 
can be examined in terms of the Type 094’s impact. 
The incorporation of the Yankee class SSBN into the Soviet Navy in the late 
1960s took crisis control out of the President's hands.  Henry Kissinger, President 
Nixon’s National Security Advisor, wrote that with the Yankee class (located in patrols 
adjacent to the American east and west coast), “SLBM warning time would be 3-15 
minutes.  Thus, because it takes minutes to report a possible attack to the President and 
get nuclear release authority, such authority for defensive missiles [i.e., retaliatory 
strikes] might have to be predelegated.” 202   It is important to note that in the original 
message, the President himself underlined predelegated, highlighting its importance.  
Nixon also wrote a handwritten response (Figure 12) on the front of Kissinger’s message.   
 
1. They have closed the gap –  
2. They continue to increase –  
3. They want to talk –  
                                                 
201 “Evolution of Subs: U.S. and Soviet Submarine Milestones of the Cold War,” National 
Geographic Online, http://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/k19/sub_detail_sov4.html (accessed 7 May 
2009). 
202 Henry Kissinger, “Letter to Richard Nixon: Issues Concerning ABM Deployment,” Declassified 
on E012958 Authority 7/7/98, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security 
Council Files, box 843, ABM Memoranda, 5 March 1969, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB36/18-01.htm (accessed 7 May 2009). 
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4. We must see that  
the gap is not widened on 
other side –  
 
Figure 12.   President Nixon’s Handwritten Response to SLBM203 
Dr. William Burr, Senior Analyst, director of the National Archive's nuclear 
history documentation project explains this note's importance, “Noting that "they" (the 
Soviet Union) had "closed the gap," that is, reached strategic parity.”204  This “strategic 
parity,” the result of Soviet SSBN developments, was cause for great concern and is 
relevant in a discussion of China’s nuclear forces today.  Without question China is 
starting to reach a level of strategic parity, certainly in terms of destructive retaliatory 
power, with the introduction of the Type 094.  The absolute ability to “retaliate” in kind 
alters American policy toward China.  If China launches a nuclear weapon, there remains 
a significant frightening thought that the President might give up release authority to a 
lower level commander.  Nixon and Kissinger’s answer to the SLBM was an increased 
push for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) forces.  
Another significant issue faced by President Nixon was the new inability to 
destroy all of the Soviet’s weapons with a preemptive strike.  Kamphausen and Scobell, 
from the United States Army War College explain: 
                                                 
203 Richard Nixon, “Handwritten Response to Henry Kissinger’s Letter: Issues Concerning ABM 
Deployment,” Declassified on E012958 Authority 7/7/98, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials 
Project, National Security Council Files, box 843, ABM Memoranda, 5 March 1969, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB36/18-01.htm (accessed 7 May 2009). 
204 William Burr, “Missile Defense Thirty Years Ago: Déjà vu All Over Again?” The National 
Security Archive Online, 18 December 2000, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB36/ 
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[The] deployment of its first Yankee-class SSBN in the late 1960s 
convinced President Nixon that the United States no longer possessed a 
viable damage limitation option against Soviet nuclear forces. A disarming 
first strike was no longer conceivable. This accelerated a shift in U.S. 
thinking towards escalation control options in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear 
competition. 205 
Considering the likelihood of invulnerability discussed in Chapter 2, this issue 
will be a concern.  How must the United States alter their policy, assured of China’s 
second strike capability?  Kamphausen and Scobell argue that the launching of the Type 
094 “will affect U.S. calculations and limit U.S. options during a crisis.”206   
Introduction of the Type 094 will force the United States to reconsider some 
current policies toward China.   Beijing recognizes the significance of the Type 094, and 
how its deployment will force the United States to look differently at China’s nuclear 
capability.  A patrolling Type 094 will also effect Washington decision-making if there is 
another crisis over Taiwan or if the United States interferes with a conflict in which 
Beijing is involved (for example a dispute over territory).  Overall, United States policy 
will have to be adjusted to account for any level of “strategic parity” with Beijing.  A 
review of current policy documents is necessary to explore where adjustments can be 
made. 
C. CURRENT U.S. POLICY 
To understand how the United States and its allies will jointly face the emerging 
Chinese SSBN threat, a review of United States security policy interests, with respect to 
Beijing, is necessary.  In spite of Beijing’s protests, the United States, in published 
security documents, specifically expresses concerns over China’s military buildup—
including the push for SSBNs.  An examination of key United States policy documents, 
the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDP), the National 
Military Strategy (NMS), and Maritime Strategy, will give the best indication of how 
Washington intends to interact with Beijing. 
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This review begins with the National Security Strategy released by the White 
House in March 2006.  The NSS broadly challenges Chinese leadership to change in 
order to continue their success.207  An element of this “change” is increased military 
transparency.  At this time, China keeps much of their military surrounded in mystery.208 
While China may in fact increase overall military transparency in the coming years, they 
will not likely increase transparency of their ballistic missile submarine program.  It 
should be noted, however, that no country, including the United States, is forthcoming 
about their submarine capabilities and intended missions.  Therefore, since broad 
“submarine” transparency is unlikely, China should directly address specific areas, such 
as communications, command and control issues.  These questions can be answered with 
terms such as “robust” or “redundant,” easing some of the uncertainty surrounding 
China’s new ballistic missile capability.  However, U.S. strategy does not end here; more 
focused analysis and Chinese threat perceptions are found in the National Defense 
Strategy. 
The National Defense Strategy (NDP), published by the office of the Secretary of 
Defense, was released in June 2008.  The NDP’s primary focus is on the challenges faced 
by the United States in the war on terror.  However, it does identify the threat of “rising 
military power of other states.”209  China’s primary military power growth, approaching 
parity with the United States and Russia, is in submarine advancements.  Submarines are 
further addressed in this report as “niche areas of military capability and competition in 
which [China] believe[s] they can develop a strategic or operational advantage.”210  The 
NDP acknowledges China’s “competing potential,” and the impact their strategic choices 
                                                 
207 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, United States of America, The 
White House, March 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (accessed 12 September 
2008), 40. 
208 China keeps much of their military a secret, most notably spending and procurement.  One element 
of submarine transparency that the United States should push for is in the area of control and safeguards 
with regards to ballistic missile submarines.   
209 2008 National Defense Strategy, United States of America, The Secretary of Defense, June 2008, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf (accessed 12 Sepember 
2008), 2. 
210 Ibid., 3. 
 91
have on international security.211  Following this logic trail, it is clear that the Type 094 
will have an impact on Asian regional security—and because of this an indirect effect on 
the world security picture.  The NDP identifies the direction the United States will take to 
meet these challenges.   
The Department will respond to China’s expanding military power, and to 
the uncertainties over how it might be used, through shaping and hedging.  
This approach tailors investment of substantial, but not infinite, resources 
in ways that favor key enduring U.S. strategic advantages.  At the same 
time, we will continue to improve and refine our capabilities to respond to 
China if necessary.212 
What exactly is shaping and hedging?  How will the United States invest 
resources to refine our capabilities to respond to a new Chinese ballistic missile 
submarine?  But first, why is submarine technology so important in Beijing right now? 
The National Military Strategy (NMS), published by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, answers this “why.”  It identifies what the new general Chinese 
submarine technology threatens—specifically United States “strategic access.” 213 
Strategic access is the concept that United States forces, specifically maritime, must have 
access to “key regions and lines of communications critical to [United States] 
security.”214  If China is able to create “anti-access environments” with submarines, they 
will have effectively defeated United States naval strategy—without matching it.215  This 
will be extremely important if the Chinese use the Type 094 to pursue a bastion strategy, 
as discussed in Chapter III.  It will be very difficult for western submarines to operate and 
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track the Type 094 in a hostile environment.  With the potential for strategic access 
limitations, due to new submarine technologies identified, what should the United States’ 
response be? 
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Maritime Strategy) of the 
United States gives the direction from which the response should come. .   First, it 
specifically states that the United States cannot be effective if it attempts to face the 
challenge of the Type 094 by themselves:  “…integrated maritime operations…send a 
powerful message to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective 
security and prosperity.”216  This publication goes on to highlight the role that “trust and 
cooperation” play among international partners.217  It is in this joint role that the 
responsibility for “sea control” lies.218    Sea control, which includes the ability to 
achieve and maintain strategic access at sea, can be denied by “the growing number of 
nations operating submarines, both advanced diesel-electric and nuclear propelled.”219  
The Maritime Strategy then lays the framework for success.  This framework must be 
built on “maritime domain awareness (MDA) and expanded intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance (ISR) capability and capacity.”220  Effective application of MDA and 
ISR in a joint environment focused on maintaining sea control to prevent anti-access 
environments is the first step in facing the challenges posed by the Type 094.   Both of 
these issues are important to regional stakeholders, specifically Japan and Taiwan, with 
Taiwan being a special case worthy of further discussion. 
1. Considerations for Future United States—Taiwan Policy 
Colin Grey, a professor of international politics and strategic studies at the 
University of Reading, England is quoted saying, “The national territory and political 
                                                 
216 The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, United States of America, The Chief of 
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independence of nuclear-armed states is not to be violated or challenged, for sensible fear 
of the possible consequences.”221  This statement, from the Chinese perspective, is 
especially important when discussing the impact of Type 094 program on potential 
conflict over Taiwan.  It is a well-known fact that China considers Taiwan to be part of 
their territory.  A more viable deterrent combined with the sea-deniability benefits of 
Chinese submarine developments decreases the likelihood of American military 
interaction at levels seen during the 1996 Straits Crisis.  
The introduction of Type 094 limits the United States response alternatives in a 
crisis involving Taiwan.  According to the Council on Foreign Relations,  
The most plausible—some would say the only likely—near-term scenario 
that could bring China and the United States to a nuclear brink would be 
an attempt to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, either by a move 
toward formal Taiwanese independence or by China seeking to 
incorporate the island by force.222 
Is Taiwan worth nuclear war?  The introduction of the Type 094 brings a degree 
of certainty to the reality of possible Chinese nuclear action over Taiwan.  For example, 
if Taiwan takes steps towards independence and China reacts by mobilizing the PLAN 
SSBN force the United States must consider nuclear weapons in any defensive strategic 
planning.  The key difference, brought about by the development of the Type 094, is the 
general acceptance by the United States that Beijing is ready to respond with nuclear 
weapons if it appears they are going to lose Taiwan.  Although this goes against stated 
Chinese nuclear doctrine, it must be considered.  If China decides on a constant at-sea 
patrol option, the United States will not have access to any observable rise in nuclear 
threat level.  Without the “heads up” that nuclear weapons are being moved, fueled, etc., 
the United States must always consider that China is one button push away from 
attacking U.S. forces or territories.  
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The Council on Foreign Relations gives their advice on these limitations.  “Given 
this conclusion, the United States has a clear interest in increased dialogue with China on 
a range of strategic issues, including U.S. ballistic missile defenses aimed against North 
Korea.”223  Admiral McVadon warned that a situation like this might occur: 
What strategic dilemmas might Washington encounter as a result of 
China’s new nuclear submarine force? Beijing’s smug confidence that 
Washington must always keep in mind China’s status as a nuclear power 
will be reinforced if the PLAN is successful with its ongoing program to 
build several modern Jin-class (Project 094) nuclear-powered ballistic-
missile submarines (SSBNs).224 
Can Washington limit themselves to simply diplomatic actions in a crisis over 
Taiwan?  The quick answer is no.   Changes to U.S. policy must occur to meet this new, 
strategically limiting, advancement. 
2. Overall U.S. Policy Change Recommendations 
According to Perry, Scowcroft, and Ferguson, “the combination of China’s still 
developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and 
nonnuclear forces, China … could be involved in an immediate or potential 
contingency.”225  Great care must be devoted to this issue.  If the Washington planners 
make difficult decisions now, before the Type 094 is fully operational, the strategic 
effects can be minimized.  Two immediate changes, cooperation with Japan over the P-3 
Maritime Patrol Craft replacement and an acknowledgement by the United States that 
Chinese military modernization is no longer completely focused on Taiwan, will 
eventually lead to the desired effect. 
First, the United States should only support a jointly agreed upon U.S.-Japan 
aerial anti-submarine platform.   The United States has been “seriously unresponsive” in 
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finding a replacement for the P-3 Orion.226  This aggravated the Japanese, who took it 
upon themselves to develop the P-X maritime patrol aircraft.  While the Japanese 
developed the P-X, the United States developed the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft 
(MMA), a program based on the Joint Strike Fighter 13 nation model.227  By choosing to 
develop the P-X in-house, Japan has negated an immeasurable amount of technological 
potential.  This inevitable result is coupled with certain compatibility issues already the 
subject of a “systems co-operation and interoperability comparative study.”228  Japan has 
already acknowledged that it may stop development of the P-X and support the MMA.  
However, given this issue, the United States must ensure that, in the future, aerial anti-
submarine technology is developed jointly with Japan. 
Unable to come to a suitable joint arrangement with Japan, Washington decided 
on the MMA as the P-3 Orion replacement.  Not surprisingly, Congressional actions in 
this matter were indicative of the recent tone of legislature emanating from Washington.  
Instead of focusing outward on the encroaching nature of Chinese submarines, Congress 
decided to focus inward – worrying only about programs that bring money to the places 
they represent.  Others have argued that the Sonobuoy Flight Vehicle is a “suitable” 
temporary replacement for the P-3 until the MMA comes online.229  Clearly this vehicle 
is a step in the wrong direction. The Sonobuoy Flight Vehicle or “Coyote” is designed for 
use in the very platform it is “suitable” to replace!230  Untested and unproven, it will do 
little to bolster United States efforts to combat the growing submarine threat. 
Next, the United States must acknowledge that certain submarine developments in 
China will lead to Chinese local area sea control.  While Taiwan is certainly an important 
issue for the United States, it should not be the focus.  The United States must state that 
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any encroachment on Japanese waters is an effort by China to establish local area sea 
control, not an effort to defeat Taiwan.  If China believes that the United States thinks, 
“China continues to modernize and develop military capabilities primarily focused on a 
Taiwan Straight conflict” China will continue non-transparent submarine development.231  
If the United States identifies Chinese submarine development as China’s path toward 
regional dominance, the United States Navy will refocus their efforts to meet this threat.  
If the United States works with Japan to counter China’s submarine modernization the 
overall cost for both nations will be reduced while simultaneously increasing the 
likelihood of overall program success and long-term interoperability.   
To successfully meet this threat to American regional dominance, changes in 
security policy must be made.  According to Thomas Donnelly, “we’ve reached the limit 
of our ability to think our way out of our military dilemma.  It’s time to stop thinking and 
start spending.  Only a larger and more capable force – a more expensive force – can give 
us the strategic options we so desperately need.”232  How will post Cold War defense size 
policy, established by President George H.W. Bush, change with the incoming 
administration?  More specifically, how will the new administration deal with 
encroachment on Japanese waters by an ever-expanding Chinese submarine force?  
Regardless of the answer, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security 
Council and the Inter-agency System describes a prerequisite. “The President needs a 
defined and smoothly functioning policy development and decision-making process.”233 
Only with a competent, well-informed group of policy writers - focused on Asian security 
through joint American-Japan regional dominance – can this challenge be met. 
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This thesis revealed the challenges to not only China, but also the region when the 
Type 094 ballistic missile submarine is placed on deterrent patrol.  Without question, this 
submarine will greatly enhance the survivability of China’s nuclear deterrent force.  The 
Type 094 will be a capable, modernly quiet submarine, and given the current state of 
western ASW, may be able to patrol undetected.  What does this mean for the future of 
China’s no-first-use policy?  When the Type 094 is put into service, China will possess 
nuclear capabilities far in excess of the requirement for limited nuclear retaliation. 
Options, such as the ability to utilize nuclear coercion or go “blow to blow” in a nuclear 
war, will be available—but it is not known whether Beijing will capitalize on these new 
opportunities.  
The leadership in China will face a number of challenges when it deploys the 
Type 094.  Most notably, the Type 094 will cause the government in Beijing to lose a 
portion of control over their nuclear weapons.  This loss of control is due to the nature of 
submarine communications, which makes constant, uninterrupted communication 
difficult if not impossible.  Currently communications may prove to be a PLAN 
weakness, but this will likely change in the near future.234  Soon the PRC will surpass the 
Russia’s ballistic missile submarine arsenal, due to a dedicated effort to develop an 
addition to Beijing’s nuclear land force.  How will the United States face this challenge? 
The United States must be ready to accept a degree of vulnerability from Chinese 
nuclear forces.  This may not be acceptable to many in Washington, but there is simply 
no other course of action.  Without a focused effort to insure ASW shortcomings are 
addressed, this vulnerability will continue for the foreseeable future.  By switching 
strategy to indicate China’s regional expansion, vice only focusing on Taiwan, 
Washington planners can adjust future weapons acquisitions to match.  The Type 094 is 
an unsettling advanced nuclear platform, with destructive capability unwarranted in 
current nuclear drawdown talks. 
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